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ABSTRACT
Should we consider possible mental orientations of decision­
makers when studying the dynamics of cooperation to produce 
collective goals? without trying to understand the mind of 
every person in a position of appreciable decision-making 
authority, we can assume certain attitudes or perceptions of 
self and environment to be represented by overall government 
policies, acts of state, and general macro-level behaviors of 
economies. Beyond material resource considerations, the 
realization of cooperation depends on decision-makers 
assuming certain attitudes and perceptions of self and 
environment both human and natural that will promote or 
permit a high degree of cooperation between themselves and 
potential competitors. In addition to material investments, 
every potential participant in the production of what they 
consider to be a needed good, but which requires cooperation, 
"buys" into the process by relinquishing some degree of 
independence. The inevitable medium of exchange is some 
portion of each participant's freedom of decision-making 
sovereignty over its own behavior and resources. Each 
participant will lose necessarily some flexibility in the use 
of "its" resources in the "sale" of some measure of 
sovereignty over its own decision-making functions. There 
are certain mental and emotional orientations that will work 
for or against cooperation.
vii
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: 
SELF-INTEREST VERSUS OTHER-INTEREST
INTRODUCTION
The goal of this paper is to examine the nature of some 
attitudes and perceptions which promote or permit a high 
degree of cooperation among political and economic decision­
makers. I wish to identify those which would account for the 
perception of collaboration as being legitimate and credible. 
The Bretton Woods international monetary system, adopted by 
members of the Western Alliance (a.k.a. Atlantic Alliance), 
is the case to be reviewed in Chapter I to derive mental and 
emotional resources needed for cooperative behavior.
"Attitude" is used here to mean a feeling or set of 
feelings that contribute to forming a behavior toward some 
thing, entity, experience, or goal. I do not limit the 
meaning of attitude to the passive condition of being "an 
affective reaction to a particular object or symbol.nl 
Rather, it is intended to describe a condition of 
emotion and sentiment that informs one's expressions and 
actions.
"Perception" refers here to a mental impression and/or 
concept of conditions and characteristics of one's 
environment. It does not suggest any degree of objective 
accuracy.
^rom Deborah Welch Larson's Analysis of "attitude" as used in Carl 
Hovland's Social-psychological research on attitude change.
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3Bretton Woods is a past endeavor in which the most 
important actors are formal allies and share a common 
cultural heritage. The likelihood of successful, interstate, 
economic collaboration could be assumed to be greater in this 
situation than in the current economic and political struggle 
between northern rich countries and southern poor countries. 
Yet, the Bretton Woods effort eventually failed and never 
fully operated as intended by its principle designer, the 
United States.
In Chapters II and III, the results of Chapter I's 
analysis will be applied to another interstate, economic 
situation in which cooperation or lack of it is the main 
issue. The second case study is current and involves states 
which are neither formal allies nor of a common cultural 
heritage. It is the Sub-Saharan Africa component of the so- 
called North-South "dialogue."2
The states of Sub-Saharan Africa believe or at least 
present the belief that structural inequalities in their 
economic relations with developed economies of the North 
constitute a major cause of their inability to achieve 
economic development. Part 1 of Chapter II is divided into 
three subsections pointing to issues that can be thought of 
as primarily internal to African states. These reasons are 
often cited by politicians and businesspersons of the
2Most of the highly diversified, complex, and “prosperous" economies 
belong to states located in the northern hemisphere. The majority of 
states with poor economies is found between the Tropic of Cancer and the 
Tropic of Capricorn or further south. The economic relationship between 
northern and southern states is presently very unequal.
4northern countries as the reasons for Africa’s economic woes. 
This information gives necessary background for going on to 
consider, in the second half of Chapter II, some of the 
structural inequalities in the North-South economic 
relationship as they apply to Sub-Saharan Africa. African 
politicians desire to gain the cooperation of Northern 
politicians and businesspersons in resolving these latter 
problems.
Chapter II sets up the second case fairly and in 
adequate detail for the purpose of this paper. It paves the 
way for Chapter Ill's application of Chapter I’s analysis to 
this current case and to extend the overall effort of this 
paper to better understand mental and emotional obstacles and 
prerequisites to endeavors at collaboration.
Chapter IV considers rational behavior within 
cooperation and competition.
CHAPTER I
ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS 
THAT SUPPORT COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR
Certain characteristics of economic relations within the 
Atlantic Alliance during the first three decades after World 
War II (WWII) will be reviewed in this chapter as a way of 
identifying a mental and emotional basis for alliance 
cohesion. However, alliance cohesion is not the main subject 
of this paper. As stated in the introduction, the underlying 
theme is cooperation and what attitudes and perceptions help 
or hinder its realization.
For an alliance to form, there must be ongoing mental, 
emotional, and material conditions which give rise to a 
perceived need for the alliance. An example of a mental and 
emotional basis is seen where there is shared fear of an 
enemy which directly, indirectly, or potentially threatens 
each alliance member in military or economic terms or both. 
The possibility that this common enemy also may consider 
itself to be an enemy or to be threatened by one or more of 
the allied states could be considered the flip side of the 
alliance-promoting fear motivation. Material circumstances 
encouraging the formation of an alliance are found in the 
scarcity of resources needed to contain the threatening 
posture of an enemy. States combine resources to develop
5
6political, military, and economic capabilities perceived by 
themselves as equal to or greater than those of the eneny or 
at least sufficient to keep aggressive or potentially 
aggressive behavior of the enemy to an acceptable level of 
relative strength.
In addition to situational or structural prerequisites 
to the perceived need of an alliance, alliance endeavors such 
as the now defunct Bretton Woods system require certain 
material resources. There will be also decision-maker 
attitudes as well as perceptions of self, alliance, non­
alliance entities, and of any given alliance endeavor which 
will support or hinder the alliance and its activities. 
Accepting the importance of material resource needs as a 
given in any situation, this paper will be focused instead on 
some mental and emotional resource needs.
Real or imagined danger to the political and economic 
security of a number of states makes an alliance among them, 
in joint defense from the danger, a logical alternative to 
each state standing separately on its own strengths.
Material reasons for forming an alliance are apparent in that 
the costs of defending the kind of economic and political 
environment in which the majority of peoples in these states 
wish to live will be less burdensome when their resources and 
efforts are combined. On the mental and emotional side, fear 
in the minds of decision-makers will probably have the effect 
of helping maintain their commitment toward support of the 
alliance.
7In the first fifteen years following WWII, there was a 
high degree of economic cooperation between Western Europe, 
Britain, and the United States. Their international economic 
collaboration was as unprecedented as was the severity and 
magnitude of the war immediately preceding it.
The common interest in economic cooperation 
[between the U.S., Britain, and Western Europe] was 
enhanced by the outbreak of the Cold War at the end 
of the 1940s. From that time, cooperation became 
necessary to face the common enemy. The economic 
weakness of the West, it was felt, would make it 
vulnerable to internal communist threats and to 
external pressure from the Soviet Union. Economic 
cooperation became necessary not only to rebuild 
Western economies and to ensure their continuing 
vitality, but also to provide for their political 
and military security. In addition, the perceived 
Communist military threat and the common interest 
in defending the West against that threat led the 
developed countries to subordinate economic 
conflict to common security interests. There was a 
greater willingness to compromise and to share 
economic burdens because of the common security 
problem.3
Why should we look at mental orientations of decision­
makers when considering the dynamics of divisive problems and 
unifying strengths of an alliance? Without trying to 
understand the mind of every person in a position of 
appreciable decision-making authority, it is still very 
likely that we can assume certain attitudes or perceptions of 
self and environment to be represented by overall government 
policies, acts of state, and general macro-level behaviors of 
economies. By this emphasis, it is not intended that we
3Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of international Economic: Relations 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), 23.
ignore economic and military resources and capabilities as 
well as geographic and environmental circumstances of states. 
These material considerations will simply not be the 
concentration of this paper.
As indicated above, fear can work as a cohesive factor 
in alliances or any group in which members feel they share a 
common sense of threat coming from outside the group.
However, a fearful state of mind can cause also problems 
within an alliance. Fear then becomes an eroding vice when 
directed toward alliance members. Before illustrating ways 
in which fear can contribute to the erosion or to some 
weakening of an alliance, the notion of regulation of 
behavior will be examined first.
An overview will be given then of some aspects of 
economic relations between members of the Western Alliance 
since WWII. From this example will be derived some necessary 
mental outlooks that political and economic decision-makers 
must hold if their actions will be intended to support an 
alliance. Several such decision-maker attitudes and 
perceptions will be outlined. Each constitutes a resource 
need in that the mental and emotional orientation must be 
shared by most decision-makers in the alliance for most of 
the time. To the extent that this is not the case, the 
alliance is weakened. Each decision-maker attitude and 
perception to be discussed below will be presented as a basis 
for regulative rules which are formulated to make decision-
9makers behave as though they held such alliance-supporting 
mental and emotional orientations, even if they do not.
The behavior of members of an economic or military 
alliance is determined by their attitudes even though their 
absolute range of choices may be shaped in large part by the 
material resources at their disposal and the overall 
environment with which they interact. Any regulation of an 
alliance among states is dependent upon affecting the 
attitudes and perceptions of decision-makers toward the 
alliance, every other member, and themselves. The 
international "order" of states is often described as 
anarchic--without government. As a prelude to looking at the 
possibilities for and nature of cooperative behavior in an 
anarchic environment, it is useful to contrast that situation 
with one in which formal government exists. An economic 
outlook will be used for description. This will serve later 
as a useful backdrop to a discussion of divisiveness within 
the Atlantic Alliance. The decision-maker orientations to be 
given in the third portion of this chapter are based on the 
following description of government.
Government is sanctioned by society (in theory) as the 
legitimate user of coercive power to ensure member-adherence 
to the society*s norms for behavior. It is endowed by 
society with the ability to coercively promote cooperative 
behavior. What are the basic purposes of coercive mechanisms 
that cause us to place their exercise in the domain of a 
government's function? Coercive mechanisms are created to
10
force decision-making units to acknowledge in their behavior 
the following aspects of action.
(1) The use of any good held in common or any 
good resulting from cooperative behavior possesses 
some degree of private benefit and cost for all 
users and participants.
(2) Thus, each individual and collective 
entity unavoidably receives some amount of the 
results of successful or failed production and/or 
maintenance of a desired good derived from 
cooperative behavior. The establishment and 
maintenance of an economic market is a good brought 
about by cooperative behavior among participants in 
the market. The consequences coming from the kind 
and degree of use of such a good will flow to all 
in varying degrees.
(3)- Therefore, everyone's private action is, 
in a sense, everyone else's private concern 
(although shared aggregately with all affected 
parties) to the extent that any action or nonaction 
toward use of a cooperatively produced good or the 
making and maintaining of a cooperative effort has 
a measure of social cost and benefit.
Coercive mechanisms are used to extend the notion of 
private property into the making, maintaining, and use of a 
good derived from cooperative effort; to force privately-made
11
decisions to weigh in the known or estimated user and 
opportunity costs with current costs. Coercive mechanisms 
are used to make clear and intense the costs of not 
cooperating in the support of societally-desired goods which 
require cooperative action on the part of its members.
The above discussion points to the importance of 
considering dominant mental and emotional orientations of 
decision-makers because all actions and explicit and implicit 
rules are based on these.
It is posited here that without government over the 
international "order" of states, mental and emotional 
attitudes of decision-makers will determine the degree of 
cooperative behavior among states. The following examples 
will hopefully bear out this point of view. The ability to 
choose a course of action is emphasized because even in times 
of great economic duress such as the 1930s, America and the 
states of Western Europe did not have to make the choice of 
putting up very high trade tariffs and using competitive 
devaluations of currencies against each other. More 
cooperative economic and political behavior would have given 
greater ease from the burdens of the time, yet, economic 
warfare prevailed in the 1930s. Inflation and unemployment 
were the primary exports from one country to the next.
Immediately after WWII and under the guidance of the 
U,S., western states cooperated in an effort to design, 
build, and maintain a liberal world economy. The reduction 
of barriers to trade and capital flows was the goal of this
1 2
new world system. To manage and trade within a liberal world 
economy, the U.S. needed trading partners. Europe was badly 
damaged by the war and needed great financial assistance in 
order to rebuild its economies. The Marshall Plan was 
designed to provide needed economic aid toward the goal of a 
restored Western Europe. It was also a political tool to 
weaken hopefully the Soviet Union's influence over Eastern 
Europe, enable West European governments to resist communist 
parties which were at their strongest immediately after the 
war, and to help towards "containing" possible Soviet 
expansionist desires and denying such desires any success in 
Western Europe. In the meantime, Britain, France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands felt militarily vulnerable to 
Soviet power and presence in Eastern Europe. They needed the 
military backing of America and eventually got it with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. They 
needed also massive economic aid from the U.S. and got much 
of that, too.
The alliance between the U.S. and Western Europe started 
out with partners very unequal militarily and economically.
For military and economic reasons, West European states felt 
a greater need for partnership with the U.S. than vice versa. 
Although these states and the U.S. did and still do share 
many interests, Western Europe was willing to accept, during 
the late 1940s and through the 50s, a degree of U.S. 
leadership and economic influence which they later came to 
increasingly resent and resist through the 1960s and 7 0s. As
1 3
an implicit rule, U.S. dominance in the non-communist world 
economy during the late 1940s and the 50s was accepted as 
necessary and beneficial to all western allies. "A whole 
host of [explicit] rules regulated, for example, the 
management of fixed exchange rates, specifying contexts in 
which certain behavioral requirements took effect. At the 
same time the framework of rules tacitly presumed the 
continued, formalized dominance of the United States in the 
international monetary system [an implicit rule] .1,4
America's dominance was considered legitimate and, due 
to its much greater economic strength, it was a credible 
arrangement. Also, America's military protection was valued 
as indispensable. Later on, feelings that the degree of U.S. 
dominance was illegitimate began to grow as this situation 
was thought to be (1) no longer necessary to the functioning 
of the world economy, (2) not in Europe's best interests, and
(3) no longer as viable because the U.S., in the 1960s, began 
to run trade deficits in addition to its yearly balance of 
payments deficits.
An example of U.S. policy that carried agreeable and 
disagreeable characteristics for other members of the western 
Alliance is found in the Bretton Woods international monetary 
system. The financial system was accepted by most of the 
Atlantic Alliance without significant dissent until the mid- 
1960s. As will be shown below, there were serious problems
^avid Dessler, College of william and Mary, Department of Government, 
"Defining and Classifying International Rules," unpublished, 1988, 3-4.
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by that time with the Bretton Woods system but problems with 
this system existed in the 50s as well; yet, dissent was very 
low in the 50s.
A new and fairly liberal international economic order 
would need an effective international monetary system. One 
part of the attempt to do so was the making of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) at Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire in 1944. Through the IMF, countries with balance 
of payments deficits could receive loans to help with their 
deficits until their economies had gotten back into shape. 
Otherwise, countries may have felt constrained to use 
external adjustment measures which would injure the financial 
interests of peoples, businesses, and governments of other 
states.
In using external measures, a state could reduce the 
value of its currency relative to foreign currencies. This 
would cut back on the ability of this country's citizens to 
buy imports. The exports of this country would also be 
cheaper to foreign purchasers. Exporters of this state may 
be encouraged with tax incentives and inporters discouraged 
with inport duties. Investments in other countries by its 
citizens may be placed under financial controls. Tariffs or 
quotas may be put in place. All of these measures would 
interfere with the free flow of goods, services and capital 
across national borders.
To the extent that the IMF helped to encourage third 
world countries to avoid imposing trade-restricting external
1 5
adjustments, every country in Western Europe appreciated the 
role of the IMF in the world economy. However, the IMF was 
seldom directly used by Western Europe through the 50s. 
"...[T]he requirements of post-war reconstruction 
necessitated maintenance of stringent controls on their 
currency and foreign trade.... Exchange rate alterations 
proved to be traumatic politically and economically under the 
Bretton Woods system. Devaluations were taken as indications 
of weakness and economic failure by states and, thus, were 
resisted.”5
A second major aspect of Bretton Woods has to do with 
its attempt to establish a system of easy convertability of 
currencies at stable exchange rates. Fixed exchange rates 
were set up with gold as the standard. The U.S. dollar was 
given a fixed value of $35 per ounce of gold. As it 
happened, the U.S. owned over 70 percent of the world's known 
gold supply by the end of WWII. All other currencies were 
valued at an exchange rate against the dollar with a small 
and specified range in which they could be adjusted up or 
down. Although the French franc, German marc, and British 
pound (among others) are internationally acceptable 
currencies, the U.S. dollar under Bretton Woods was the major 
store of value, reserve asset, medium of exchange, and unit 
of account by which to assess trading transactions. Because 
of these qualities and the fact that holding onto dollars
5David H. Blake and Robert S. Walters, The Politics of Global Economic 
Relations, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Press, 1983), 57.
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earns interest while gold does not, the dollar was especially
desired by every country in need of foreign exchange. This
opened up enormous opportunities for the U.S. to expand its
economic, political, and military presence. The U.S. did so
but at levels that yearly exceeded its international
earnings. A balance of payments deficit developed quickly
and kept on growing.
...these deficits were also financing the 
establishment of a massive foreign presence by the 
United States through private investment, economic 
aid, and the maintenance of a system of military 
bases abroad. This posed few problems in U.S. 
relations with its major partners because they felt 
that their own economic, political, and security 
interests were served by these American actions.
If American deficits were to cease, the allies 
reasoned, their own interests would be hurt.6
The U.S. deficits were not taken seriously by most other
members of the western Alliance as long as America’s economy
remained internationally competitive. The U.S. was not
running a balance of trade deficit and was not making
significant internal or external adjustments in the 50s to
bring its payments deficits under control. Furthermore,
while members of the alliance (except for France under the
guidance of De Gaulle) did not attempt to convert their
dollars for the Bretton-Woods-specified equivalent, the U.S.
could continue its overseas investments almost for "free."7
In the 1960s, the U.S. economy experienced a trade
deficit to go along with its payments deficit. Other
^lake and waiters, 61.
7For further discussion of this issue, see Spero; especially Chapter I.
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alliance states then joined France in a serious concern over 
the continued viability of the Bretton woods system. One of 
the results of American expansion of its multinational 
corporations (MNCs) into Europe was that a growing number of 
Europeans came to resent what they feared to be the 
"Americanization” of Europe. This element of tension added 
to the strain on alliance members’ "support" of Bretton 
Woods.
The Bretton Woods system was officially ended in 1972. 
How it ended and what replaced it will not be reviewed here. 
For this paper, the important question to be drawn from the 
Bretton Woods experience is why did the criticism of Bretton 
Woods pick up in the 60s and not in the 50s (when appreciable 
problems did exist). It could be said that the financial and 
opportunity costs to Europe of participating in Bretton Woods 
had not become greatly visible to most members until the 
1960s. I believe such an answer is only partially true. 
Visibility of the drawbacks of the system to Western Europe 
was clouded by fears of potential Soviet threats to security. 
This reason for lack of criticism of U.S. leadership in the 
50s is only in addition to the fact that Europe needed U.S. 
economic and military aid and in large doses. On the part of 
West European decision-makers, fear of the eastern bloc and 
communist parties in Western Europe was diminishing in the 
60s while there was a growing fear that "excessive" American 
presence in their economies was not in their long-run best 
interests.
1 8
presence in their economies was not in their long-run best 
interests.
The 1958 Berlin Crisis which ended in 1961 with the 
building of a wall around West Berlin showed that the Soviet 
Union was not anxious to invade an area that the U.S. 
considered to be part of the Western Alliance. The 1962 
Cuban Missile Crisis indicated that the Soviets were not 
willing to go to war over nonvital issues. The 1963 Partial 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was an official act of military and 
political cooperation between the superpowers. A detente of 
sorts had replaced much of the Cold War tensions and 
uncertainties. A relaxing of fears, perhaps, permitted more 
attention on the degree of American investments in Europe, 
America's yearly balance-of-payments deficits, and its 
decreasing competitiveness in international markets vis a vis 
Western Europe and Japan.
For America's part, it was beginning to fear its 
declining share of world trade and the rising competitiveness 
of the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan. Buy- 
America and buy-local campaigns for government purchases
reached an all-time high in the U.S. during the 60s. " the
Buy-America criterion for government purchases; which was 
laboriously reduced from 25 percent as a normal rate in the 
1930s to 10 percent in the 1950s, was raised to 50 percent in 
the balance-of-payments weakness of the 1960s."8 "In short,
8Peter H. Lindert, International Economics. 8th ed. (Homewood, llinois: 
Irwin Publications, 1986), 188.
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the Cold War detente and the economic resurgence of Western 
Europe and Japan combined to place a severe strain on 
cohesion among major Western states."9
Some general statements can be made about perception and 
attitudes of decision-makers toward potential partners in a 
cooperative endeavor. There are some specific perceptions 
and attitudes that permit decision-makers to persist over 
time in the support of cooperative behavior. These are drawn 
from the partial sketch of economic relations within the 
Western Alliance given above. The following list includes 
several conditions of perception and attitude required for 
the production and maintenance of cooperatively-produced 
goods such as economic markets in which each state 
consistently benefits. No claim is made that this list 
comprises all requirements--just a few.
(1) Participants must perceive direct "private" gains 
to be received from some form of cooperative behavior.
(2) Private good must be perceived as at least partly 
dependent upon private good of others who also need the 
good(s) to be produced via cooperation.
In a military alliance, each ally will benefit from 
every other ally's own continued or increased strength. The 
same logic holds true in an economic alliance. Both the 
economic and political aspects of America's Marshall Plan for 
Europe were based on this reasoning.
9Blake and Walters, 16.
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(3) There must be an attitude of willingness to accept 
a degree of dependence on other participants in a cooperative 
endeavor.
There are some aspects of this third requirement that 
can be briefly addressed. The first is the most general and 
concerns the fact that cooperation replaces, to some extent, 
competitive behavior. This demands a willingness to incur 
some measure of shared sovereignty over decision-making which 
means a loss of some individual freedom.
By the loss of some individual freedom I mean there will 
be some "...loss of independence or loss of control over 
one's activities, resulting from the accumulation of 
collective constraints."10 Such costs "...are incurred over 
and above the more direct payments, to whatever institutional 
arrangement the state has selected, for the cost of
performing the task such costs may not appear significant,
or may not be calculable, for any one particular arrangement. 
Over the long run a state is expected to seek to keep such 
interdependence costs to the least necessary level.
...[T]hus, it follows that the propensity for international 
organization will be determined by the interplay between the 
need to become dependent upon others for the performance of 
specific tasks, and the general desire to keep such 
dependence to the minimum level necessary."11
10John Gerard Ruggie, "Collective Goods and Future International 
Collaboration," American Political Science Review, vol. 66, 1972: 878.
^Ruggie, 87 8.
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A second aspect of accepting some degree of co- 
dependence is the shared vulnerability and security cost 
brought on to participants in cooperative behavior with 
regard to each other. Unintentional exposure or intentional 
disclosure of information regarding one's needs and their 
magnitude in a competitive environment is generally perceived 
as increasing one's vulnerability. Others can choose to 
competitively use or try to use this information to 
extrapolate what the subject will be willing to incur in 
order to meet its needs.
If a competitor has made a correct analysis of what said 
subject is willing to do to meet its needs, then the 
competitor may have a handle on the subject. In a 
competitive environment, this constitutes power to achieve 
further profit on one's own behalf or some kind of 
improvement of position. As pointed out earlier, fear of 
facing this kind of vulnerability caused Western European 
states to avoid, as much as possible, direct use of the IMF 
under the Bretton Woods system or the adjustment of their 
currencies in relation to the dollar. Even if the 
cooperating parties are able to accept this condition within 
their group, there is the potential for information disclosed 
within the group to leak to parties outside the group. An 
increase in the size of the cooperative group increases also 
the chances for such leaks of information exploitable by 
outside competitors.
22
A third aspect of accepting some co-dependence is that 
all participants must perceive the commitment of fellow 
producers to the production of a mutually desired collective 
gain as being genuine. An economic alliance such as a 
cartel will fall apart when this condition is no longer met. 
For example, if a member of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) suspects other members of 
persistently "making a killing" by selling oil in large 
amounts at a price lower than the price agreed upon by the 
cartel, then where is the motivation to continue its own 
belief in and loyalty to the cartel's original purpose?
The provisions of the 1947 convention on trade policies 
entitled the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 
were designed to eliminate quotas and other trade barrier 
policies except for tariffs. Tariffs were to be the only 
acceptable form of trade barrier and its "legitimate" use 
confined to very specific circumstances. From that point, 
tariffs were to be systematically negotiated away. All 
members of the Western Alliance were participants in GATT.
Without going into the issue of how successful or not 
GATT has been in reducing tariffs and promoting free trade, 
it is important to note that each country has developed a 
multitude of trade barriers that are not directly addressed 
by GATT. Some of these methods of "cheating" on GATT 
agreements are as follows: overly complicated and difficult 
rules of customs administration; customs classifications 
which are changed after goods have been sold so they end up
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falling into more than one tariff category12; inspection-on- 
point-of-origin rules; health and safety requirements hard or 
impossible to satisfy; labelling regulations demanding the 
origin of each component or ingredient of a good be shown on 
a label13; compulsory preferences demanding some percentage of 
ingredients or components of imports be domestic to the state 
for which the imports are intended14; favorable tax schedules 
and rebates given to exporters and perhaps the reverse done 
to importers. There are other forms of trade barriers but 
this array makes the point that ways of cheating on GATT are 
many.
If political decision-makers and the business groups 
that try to pressure them for favorable decisions do not 
believe in the integrity of other states' official 
commitments to uphold the purposes of GATT, then they will 
feel compelled to "cheat" as well. They will fear the losses 
they would surely receive for being the only member of GATT 
completely loyal to GATT.
If decision-makers in an alliance or any cooperative 
endeavor are to avoid undermining their efforts via their own 
actions, then the great importance of taking into account the 
mental and emotional orientations of political and economic 
decision-makers, within the alliance as well as without, 
should be acceptable to both Marxist and capitalist, dove and
12Professor Matthews, lecture on “Barriers to Trade," given at the 
College of William and Mary, March 9, 1988.
13Professor Matthews, lecture on "Barriers to Trade."
14lbid.
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hawk, Machiavellian Prince and satyagraha. Just as an 
economy of the use of material resources can be conceived of 
and worked toward, an economy of thought and sentiment can be 
conceived which best supports an activity. The choice 
between cooperation and competition is always just that--a 
choice. We simply have to acknowledge to ourselves which 
course of action and probable results we desire most, develop 
a sense of what it requires, and present ourselves and our 
actions to others in a way that fosters mental and emotional 
support for one path or the other. If cooperation is the 
choice, then decision-makers must take into account, among 
other things, the perceptions and attitudes outlined above.
Emphasis on the mind's place in international relations 
is not intended as a substitute for assessments of power 
distribution. The point here is that the making of choices 
is a power in itself; perhaps, not an original point of view 
but one worth witnessing from time to time. The use of that 
power can be habituated toward achieving particular long-term 
objectives. Legal documents embodying explicit regulative 
rules like the Articles of Agreement for the IMF or implicit 
regulative rules like U.S. economic dominance in the Bretton 
Woods system will always reflect interests in "conflict, 
negotiation, and cooperation"15 and compromises resulting from
^David Dessler, Professor at the College of William and Mary,
Department of Goverment, explained on page 6 of his unpublished papar 
dated 1988 and entitled "Defining and Classifying international Rules" 
that international rules can be and are formed with or without there 
being a consensus. "What is shared is rather an awareness or 
understanding that there exist entities to be taken as rules, i.e., that 
there exist international structures reproduced and transformed by
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such exchanges. It will be the case that actions or rules 
(explicitly or implicitly conveyed) intended to achieve long­
term cooperation within an alliance or any other cooperative 
endeavor will have to account for the decision-maker 
attitudes and perceptions given above.
nations in their efforts to control and influence one another’s 
behavior. The actual rules are the focus of conflict, negotiation, and 
cooperation.”
CHAPTER II
NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE:
A PRESENT NEED
As discussed in the introduction, the case study used in 
chapters II and III is a current, interstate, economic 
relationship in which cooperation or the lack of it is the 
heart of the problem. It involves the development or the 
attempt by some states to develop more equitable economic 
relations between states of Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Northern Hemisphere's wealthier states. In two parts,
Chapter II sets up the case by presenting arguments for and 
against the notion that northern "developed" states have an 
obligation to assist in the economic development of states in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Chapter III will use this situation as a backdrop to 
extending Chapter I's study of attitudes and perceptions that 
are either obstacles or prerequisites to cooperative 
behavior.
Part Is Internal Issues
The causes of Africa's problems do not all stem from 
North-South economic relations. To concentrate on the 
inequalities in this relationship alone will ignore many of
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Africa's self-made difficulties. Some internal causes of 
economic hardships are briefly described below.
Part II focuses on structural inequalities in North- 
South economic relations as a significant, though not 
exclusive, source of economic underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The assumption in Part II is that improvements in 
North-South economic relations will place African states in a 
better position to deal with and hopefully resolve internally 
generated causes of mass poverty.
Part I is divided into three sections. It should first 
be noted that issues listed under sections B and C below, as 
compared to A, are far more sensitive to pressures coming 
from debts African governments incur in their trade and 
financial relations with developed countries and the 
financial organizations primarily supported by developed 
countries (DCs). Even so, the information in A will be 
included since it is often pointed to by politicians of 
Northern states who argue for there being no hard obligation 
for rich states to assist poor states.
(A) Civil Strife, Civil War, Interstate Hostilities
Civil strife is prevalent in many African states. The 
following point made in this paragraph favors the arguments 
of Southern state politicians but is inserted here since this 
issue of inner- and interstate hostilities in Africa will not 
be directly addressed again. In most cases, the problem 
originated or was worsened when colonial powers put state
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boundaries in place with little consideration for the 
traditional locations of tribes, let alone, past political 
relations between various tribal communities. Often, the 
result is that a politically dominant tribe will favor itself 
over other tribes. For example, the Shona tribe in Zimbabwe 
is aligned with the ruling ZANU party and works to 
economically benefit itself at the expense of others.16 
Another example is seen in Nigeria during its Second Republic 
from 197 9 to 1984. Peoples of the Hausa and Fulani tribes of 
Northern Nigeria had much greater influence with the ruling 
party (The National Party of Nigeria) than did peoples of the 
Yoruba, Ibo, Kanuri, and other tribes.17
Civil strife becomes civil war when the official 
government is unable to govern the group(s) that is 
secessionary or simply anti-the-ruling-party. In Africa, 
civil wars are usually tribally and regionally related. The 
start of 1988 found Ethiopia, Uganda, Mozambique, Angola,
Chad, and Sudan involved in civil wars. These civil wars 
create millions of internally displaced persons and 
interstate refugees. These people cannot be economically 
productive while "on the run" or assist any government policy 
designed to reclaim desert for agricultural purposes.
Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique, Angola, and Sudan are among the
16Lloyd Timberlake, Africa in Crisis (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: New
Society Publishers, 1986), 188.
17Toyin Falola and Julius Ihonvbere, The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's 
Second Republic (London; Zed Books, 1985).
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six countries hardest hit by hunger, according to a 1985
United Nations report on Africa.18
The relationship between military conflict and 
drought/famine is complex...[D]rought is connected 
with misuse of soil and with poor agricultural 
practices. Obviously a government fighting 
militarily for its life is going to put a fairly 
low priority on tree-planting, terracing, and on 
sound agriculture in general. Its capacities will 
be devoted to war, not land reclamation.19
Sub-Saharan countries that experienced regional and/or 
general civil wars for some period of time between 1945 and 
1982 are shown in Table 1. Those dates which are underlined 
in Table 1 indicate a change in regimes as a result of civil 
war. The source used for this list defines a change of regime 
to be "only where power has been transferred without the 
agreement of the pre-war government and there has been no 
continuity of policy."20 The dates given are approximate. 
Dates preceded or followed by show that the exact 
beginnings or endings of a civil war are unknown. Dates 
surrounded by "*" indicate the most recent year of major 
activity. In reviewing the data in this table, please keep 
in mind that civil tensions do not develop into civil war 
overnight but have their source in problems extending further 
back in time. Information placed within brackets is added by 
me.
18United Nations Office for Emergency Operation in Africa, "Status 
Report on the Emergency Situation in Africa as of 1 Oct 1985" (New York: 
1985) .
19Timberlake, 188.
20Michael Kidron and Dan Smith, The War Atlas. Armed Conflict-Armed 
pearg (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), "Notes to the Maps", l.
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Table., l
Mauritania
Chad
Sudan
Ethiopia
Dj ibouti
Somalia
Gambia
Guinea-Bissau 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Ghana 
Benin 
Nigeria 
Central 
African 
Republic 
Uganda 
Kenya
Seychelles 
Camaroon 
Equitorial 
Guinea 
Gabon 
Congo 
Zaire 
Rwanda 
Burundi 
Tanzania 
Cameroon 
Angola 
Zambia 
Malawi 
Madagascar 
Namibia 
Zimbabwe 
Mozambique 
South Africa
*1962/gen
1965-82/gen; [presently involved in civil 
war (P)]
1954-72/reg; 1971/gen; [P]
1974-79*/gen; 1980*/gen; *1980*/reg;
*l98l*/reg; [P]
1977*/gen 
1967 -68/reg 
1981/gen 
1963-74/gen 
*0.9£9/gen; 1971/gen 
1948/gen 
*1977/gen 
1967-70/reg
JL9Z5/gen
*JL252/gen; 19 6 4/gen; 1980*/gen; [P] 
1952-56/gen; 1964/gen; *1980)/reg;
1982/gen 
1982/gen
195.5 .--£9./gen
*1974/gen; *1971/gen 
1964/gen
1963/gen; 1968/gen; 1972-73/gen
*19.611/gen; I960-67/reg; 1977/gen
1959/gen; 1964, 1965-66/gen
*1972/gen
1964/gen
1978/gen
1961-75/gen: 1975/gen; [P]
1964/gen; 1977/reg
1959-64/gen: 1965/gen; 1967/gen
1947-48/gen; 1971-72/gen
1975/gen
1965~7.4/gen; 1981/gen; [P]
1965-74/gen; 1981/gen; [P]
1960/reg; 1976*/gen [presently: very high 
level of tension]
Note: [P] = presently involved in civil war; * = exact
beginning is unknown; *____* = most recent year of major
activity; gen = general civil war; reg = regional civil 
war. Source: Michael Kidron and Dan Smith, The War 
Atlas. Armed Conflict-Armed Peace (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1983).
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Tensions and troubles from border conflicts, civil 
wars/strife, and interstate wars create added emphasis on 
military expenditures and take away from governmental 
investment of human and financial resources in areas of 
agriculture, education, health, social security programs (if 
any), transportation, communications, and distribution 
infrastructures. Arms inports for the states of Africa in 
1961 amounted to 111 million dollars. By 197 8, the arms 
imports totalled 1,986 million dollars.21 Clandestine trades 
are excluded from this total so real figures are higher.
Formal declarations of war between states are not as
common today around the world as in the past. However, there 
are hostilities or at least tense relations with implications 
of possible military action between the following states: 
Morocco and Algeria; Ethiopia and Somalia; Libya and Egypt; 
Libya and Chad; Tanzania and major non-ruling tribe in 
Uganda; Morocco, Mauritania, and Western Sahara; South Africa 
with all its neighboring states; Angola and its neighbors; 
Sudan and Ethiopia; and others.
(B) Governmental Favoritism
Governmental favoritism of urban populations at the 
expense of rural farmers and pastoralists is a problem which 
contributes to underproduction in agriculture and famines.
Most African governments subsidize non-domestic meats.
21Kidron and Smith, map no. 3.
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cereals, and other foods for the benefit of urban peoples; 
urban administrative, commercial and industrial growth; and 
to increase profits from sales of export crops for applying 
toward debts and the purchase of imports.
Farmers and pastoralists are unable to sell their 
foodstuffs at prices that afford them security from year to 
year variations in rainfall or to get through the "hungry 
months" just before harvest without going into high interest 
debt. Farmers do not possess the financial resources to 
adequately invest in improvements to their farms (terracing, 
tree-planting, sowing of soil-binding plants such as lucerne, 
elephant grass, and clover) and agricultural inputs (pest- 
and drought-resistant varieties of seeds and seedlings, 
fertilizers, equipment, draft animals). This issue will be 
discussed further in Part II.
(C) Overpopulation, Falling Per Capita Production, 
Deforestation, Disturbed Cultivation Patterns
Approximately 583 million people inhabit Africa. Along 
with the Middle East, Africa has an annual population growth 
rate of 2.8 percent--one of the highest in the world.22 
However, a simple statement of population size and its rate 
of growth is fairly meaningless without also addressing the 
ability of environmental and social life-support systems to 
hold up through time. The following facts serve to make
22Lester R. Brown, "Analyzing the Demographic Trap," in State of ..the 
wnri r\ i9«7. ed. Lester R. Brown (New York: w. W~. Norton and Co., 1987),
22.
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clear the struggling nature of African states' efforts to 
meet basic needs for all citizens, let alone to achieve the 
goals of economic modernization.
1. Overpopulation and Falling Per Capita Production.
Average yearly production growth in Africa’s agriculture 
was 3.0 percent between 1961 and 1970. From 1971 to 1984, 
the average fell to 1.2 percent.23 "For the world's 36 
poorest countries, twenty-six of them in Africa, the level of 
per capita food consumption declined by about 3.0 percent 
during the 197 0s."24 While overall production of food, 
beverages, and raw agricultural materials (cotton, jute, 
rubber, tobacco) declined, real growth in the prices of 
agricultural commodities for all developing countries 
declined as well.25 This meant income losses to most people 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially rural farmers and 
pastoralists.
African governments also earned less. Foreign currency 
income from commodity exports fell and contributed to their 
need to borrow from other governments; from intergovernmental 
organizations such as the IMF, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the 
International Development Association (IDA); and private 
banks. In fact, the "ratio of total debt disbursed to annual 
exports of goods and services grew from 71.8 percent in 1975
23World Bank, World Development Report 1986. (New York: Oxford
University Press), 4.
24World Bank, 7 .
^Ibid. 7.
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to 230.9 percent in 1984. This increase was also faster than 
for the rest of the developing countries."26
Did income from exports of minerals and metals make up 
for losses in agricultural commodities? No. From 1950 to 
1984, the average annual percentage change in real growth of 
commodity prices for metals and minerals was -0.09. Between 
197 0 and 1979, the average annual change was even worse:
-4.06 percent.27
Governments are less and less able to take care of their 
ever-growing populations. "Food imports have increased ten­
fold during the past two decades."28
With little and lessening economic security for 
individuals, population growth rates will not decrease, but, 
instead will continue to remain too high for African states 
and economies to take care of everyone. On the surface, 
continued production of large families seems like illogical 
behavior on the part of citizens, yet, having large extended 
families is a method of creating social insurance for older 
generations.29 Only real and stable improvements in the 
economic welfare of peoples along with the provision of 
government-supported social security can effectively develop
26Reginold H. Green and Stephany Griffith-Jones, "External Debt: Sub-
Saharan Africa's Emerging Iceberg," from Africa in Crisis, ed. by Tore 
Rose (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
1985), 213.
27world Bank, 7.
28UNICEF: The Children’s Fund of the United Nations, within Human Reach
(New York: UNICEF, 1985), 23.
29Barry Commoner, "How Poverty Breeds Overpopulation," in World Food, 
Population. and Development, ed. Gigi M. Berardi' (Totowa, New Jersey: 
Rowan and Allanheld, 1985), 43-73.
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incentives for rural peoples and urban poor to build smaller 
families. Statistical support of this assertion is provided 
by the relationship between measures of Gross National 
Product (GNP) and fertility. Increases in GNP per capita per 
year are strongly associated with decreases in fertility 
rates.
In a sense, the demographic transition30 is a means 
of translating the availability of a decent level 
of resources, especially food, into a voluntary 
reduction in birthrate. It is a striking fact that 
the efficiency with which such resources can be 
converted into a reduced birthrate is much higher 
in the developing countries than in the advanced 
ones...[T]he per capita cost of bringing the 
standard of living of poor countries with rapidly 
growing populations to the level which--based on 
the behavior of people all over the world--would 
motivate voluntary reduction of fertility is very 
small, compared to the per capita wealth of 
developed countries.31
2. Overpopulation and Deforestation.
Overpopulation adds to desertification as trees are used 
for fuel faster than the environment can replace them.32 Soil 
building- and soil-maintaining ecosystems in which trees have
30The so-called Demographic Transition has occurred in countries with 
developed economies. It begins when iirqprovements in medicine, health 
care, and sanitation are introduced to (or developed in) a society 
possessing high rates of infant mortality, fertility, and death. For a 
time, population grows at higher rates. The absolute size of population 
rises, also. Eventually, the fertility rate lessens to a point far 
below its level before the initial rise. The populations of developed 
countries are now much larger than before the Demographic Transition but 
have longer life spans and very low rates of growth, infant mortality, 
and fertility. The growth in per capita economic prospertiy, increased 
career opportunities for women, and government policies of social 
security and unemployment assistance are considered by many to be the 
main reasons for decreasing fertility rates.
31Commoner, 7 0-71.
32Erik P. Eckholm, "The Other Energy Crisis," in World Foodr Population. 
and npyplnnment. 263-269. Ismail H. Abadlla, "The Killer Axe: Farming 
and Deforestation in a Fragile Ecological System-in Kordofan," Northeast 
Africa Studies 7. no. 2 (1985): 59-65.
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a central role are damaged and topsoils are depleted of
nutrients without sufficient renewal. Sub-Saharan Africa has
lost so many trees to firewood that regional water tables are
lowered to the point of killing other trees from a simple
lack of water. As trees and ground cover indigenous to
wooded areas decrease, the rate at which water evaporates
after a rain is increased. Trees and ground covers lower the
temperature of soil and this, in turn, lowers evaporation
rates and raises the retention of water from rains.33
High evaporation rates are a major source of lost
water.34 Most of Sub-Saharan Africa has a great need to
conserve its rainfall.
Shortage of rain is a continual problem for areas 
such as the Sahel and the Kalahari in the 
Southwest; the more significant problem for most of 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the annual distribution 
rather than the quantity of rainfall. The 
movements of the [Inter-tropical Convergence Zone] 
results in many areas receiving all or most of 
their rainfall within a four-to-six-month period, 
barely sufficient time for crops to mature.35
In "good" years of adequate or even relatively adequate
rainfall, other types of problems result from deforestation.
Trees serve to hold soil down from being carried off by winds
and rains. Trees reduce also the amount of dust in the
33Lester R. Brown and Edward C. Wolf, "Soil Erosion: Quiet Crises in
the World Economy," Worldwatoh Paper, no. 60, (Sept 1984).
34Thomas R. Batten, Problems of African Development. Part I:--Land
t.abnnr (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 59.
35Charles Guthrie, "The African Environment," in Food in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, eds. Art Hansen and Della E. McMillan (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, inc., 1986), 89.
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atmosphere which, in sufficient quantities, will inhibit 
cloud formation and lessen the chances of precipitation.36
A World Bank report in 1985 said that 20.9 million 
people could be sustainably supplied with fuelwood in the 
countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, and Senegal.37 The total population at mid-1984 was
34.5 million.38 Adequate fuelwood could not be supplied to
13.6 million without seriously damaging woodlands and
inducing further desertification.
...in 1980 some 50 million people in Sub-Saharan 
Africa experienced fuelwood shortages and were 
unable to meet their basic fuelwood requirements.
Another 130 million Africans obtained their minimum 
fuelwood requirements through excessive 
exploitation of wood resources, with projected 
population growth, these numbers may triple by the 
year 2000.39
3. Overpopulation and Disturbed Cultivation Patterns. 
Overpopulation in farming communities forces many farmers to 
use increasingly marginal lands. As the outer limits of 
arable land are cultivated, crop rotation and shifting 
cultivation are replaced with more and more continuous forms 
of cultivation--fallow periods are shortened. This pattern 
degrades arable land and adds to desertification.
The fact that African governments emphasize cash crops 
over food crops and artificially depress prices for food
36Noel v. Lateef, crisis in the Saheli ft .Case Study, in Development
cooperation (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), 179-216.
37Brown, 25.
^Newspaper Enterprise Association, inc. (NEA), The World Almanac (New 
York: NEA, 1986), 588-589.
3901ivia webley, "Fuelwood," in Food in Sub-Saharan Africa, 254.
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crops (mostly for reasons given in section B above), causes 
farmers also to emphasize cash crops. Persistent cash 
cropping will deplete soils of specific nutrients fairly 
quickly.40
The governmental subsidization of non-domestic meats 
will also lead to desertification by "...robbing the local 
pastoralists of the traditional urban markets for their 
animals, leading to a buildup of animal populations and 
increased pressures on the land which convert it to deserts 
[compaction of soil; trampling and over-grazing of plants]."41 
This problem has had a significant inpact on top soils even 
though periods of drought and approaching famine cause many 
livestock to die from lack of food or to be slaughtered by 
pastoralists and farmers as a food replacement for failed 
crops.42
With all this said, how much land is actually lost to 
processes of desertification? Before answering this 
question, it should be noted again that in addition to poor 
land management much of Sub-Saharan Africa suffers from 
rather short rainy seasons and periodic serious declines in 
overall rainfall which help to expand deserts. An estimate 
to the above question is that "24,000 square miles of African
^The African strategy Review Group, Accelerated. Development in Sufr- 
Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (Washington D.C.: The World Bank,
1981).
41Maurice F. Strong, "Beyond the Famine: New Hope for Africa," Annual
Memorial Lecture, 11 Nov 1985 (David Davies Memorial Institute of 
International Studies, 1985), 25-26.
42Ivan Ray Tannehill, Drought: its Causes and Effects (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton university Press, 1947).
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land is turned into desert by overgrazing, deforestation, and 
poor farming practices" each year.43
Rapidly increasing population, dangerously high rates of 
deforestation and soil degradation, yearly fluctuations in 
amounts of rainfall, civil and interstate tensions and wars, 
and falling per capita production of food and exportable 
commodities combine to produce severe hardships for all but a 
few Africans. What could make matters worse? The next part 
of this chapter addresses this question.
Part II; North-South issues
African states that have gained independence since WWII 
have felt compelled to enter a world market economy dominated 
by highly diversified economies possessing strong industrial 
bases; developed service and commodity sectors; developed 
transportation, distribution, communications, education, and 
financial systems.
Economies of northern states were and are very capable 
of producing secondary goods which require scientific, 
engineering, and systems management expertise and knowledge. 
Secondary goods contain primary goods (commodities) as 
manufacturing inputs such as fuels, minerals, plants (cotton, 
woods, rubber, jute, etc.), and animal products such as 
leather and wool. Secondary products are priced to include
43Kathy Koch, "Strategies for Economic Turnabout," from Editorial 
Research Report, vol. 11, no. 17, 17 Nov 1986 (Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly, 1986): 821.
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the costs of purchasing the primary commodities. The prices 
include high labor costs (relative to labor costs for 
production of primary commodities), expensive expert 
services, other components of manufacturing overhead, and a 
profit margin of some size. Furthermore, items such as 
computers, trucks, tractors, jeeps, automobiles, construction 
machines and equipment will have much higher transportation 
costs per pound than most primary commodities.
The exports of least-developed economies, on the other 
hand, consist almost entirely of primary commodities: 
foodstuffs, in addition to the items listed above. The 
pricing of these items is more sensitive to conditions of 
supply in international markets than are most secondary 
products.
The developing countries (a.k.a. Less Developed 
Countries or LDCs) are at a further disadvantage in that they 
did not enter independence in a position to extract (in some 
cases refine) and market their commodities without the 
involvement of many outside groups: multinational
corporations; governments of developed economies; 
international financial organizations such as the IMF, World 
Bank, and IDA; and private banks. LDCs needed the secondary 
products of developed countries (DCs) to bring to market many 
of their own primary commodities (e.g. minerals, metals, and 
oil) as well as requiring massive inputs of information, 
technology, and expertise.
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LDCs necessarily sacrificed much control over their 
resources and have continually worked to transfer control to 
themselves. In other words, in much the same way that 
businesspersons may go into debt when starting an enterprise 
by borrowing from banks or financiers, newly-independent 
African states have had to go into debt to practically 
"start-up" a government with its bureaucracy and an economy 
capable of entering the world's markets. But, unlike a 
corporation which gains necessary capital by selling 
ownership of the company to investors in the form of shares 
of stock, a sovereign and supposedly "independent" state has 
no intention of deliberately and permanently transferring 
ownership of the state from itself unto other entities. The 
1962 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
Resources put out by the United Nations General Assembly is 
an example of poor states trying to regain control of their 
national resources.
Terms of trade between DCs and LDCs and the nature of 
the types of goods being traded have strongly favored DCs.
This relationship has added to the LDCs external debts 
incurred largely through efforts at "modernization."
A dilemma results. Many African states are still among 
the poorest and least economically developed, yet, have 
incurred great external debts with growing interest. At the 
same time, foreign exchange reserves (acquired from exports) 
have not similarly grown.
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In fact, it has been estimated by the IMF in the 
1983 World Economic Outlook that for all Africa the 
value of foreign exchange reserves in 1983 was 
lower than it had been in 1973, even in nominal 
terms. The ratio of reserves to imports of goods 
and services for non-oil exporting developing 
Africa has, as a consequence, persistently 
declined: from 18.4 percent in 1973 to a mere 15.3 
percent in 1983, which implies coverage of less 
than one month of imports (clearly an extremely low 
ratio, much lower than that for all other 
developing countries)
Tanzania's gross international reserves in 197 0 were 65 
million dollars and by 1984 had dropped to 27 million 
dollars. This latter amount covered 0.3 months of 1984 For 
the same two years, the numbers are as follows for nine other 
African countries: Somalia, 21 million dollars in imports.
Table 2
External debt on long-term and IMF loans.
1970 .. . .. 12M
Somalia $77 million $1,335
Benin 41 582
Sierra Leone 59 416
Sudan 388 6,257
Senegal 131 1,766
Zambia 653 3,500
Cote d'Ivoire 267 6,776
Cameroon 140 2,347
Mauritius 32 521
Ethiopia 169 1,459
Zaire 311 4,663
Niger 32 884
Uganda 138 990
Kenya 407 3,441
People's Republic
of Congo 144 1,396
Note: Values given in constant U.S. dollars.
Long-term debts consist of (1) public and publicly 
guaranteed loans, and (2) private nonguaranteed debts 
Source: World Bank, world Development Report 198£,
p. 208.
^Green and Griffiths-Jones, 213.
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1970,7 million dollars in 1984, 0.1 months of 1984 import 
coverage; Benin, 16, 6, ?; Sierra Leone, 39, 16, 1.0; Sudan, 
22, 17, 0.2; Senegal, 22, 13, ?; Zambia, 515, 55, 0.6; Cote 
d ’Ivoire, 119, 19, 0.1; Cameroon, 81, 63, 0.3; Mauritius, 45, 
35, 0.7.45
The same above-referenced World Bank report listed 
Tanzania's debt on long-term and IMF loans as 265 million in 
197 0. The world Bank defines long-term debt as composed of 
debts which are (l) public and publicly guaranteed debts, or
(2) private non-guaranteed debts. Information on short-term 
debts for 197 0 was not available to the World Bank so their 
statements on short-term debts as of 1984 will not be 
included here. Table 2 shows external debt on long-term and 
IMF loans for sixteen other Sub-Saharan states.
The picture presented by the data in Table 2 is not 
good; but, the total financial burdens of Sub-Saharan 
countries are even worse for reasons clearly given in the 
following statement by Reginold Green and Stephany Griffith- 
Jones.
in fact, present reported data seriously understate 
the size of the debt burden. First, World Bank 
data are limited to long- and medium-term 
government and government-guaranteed debt. Revised 
Bank data for selected countries suggest that 
adding short-term debt would raise the total by 
perhaps one-third, and that non-official debt would 
add another 5 to 10 percent. Second, even World 
Bank and Bank for international Settlements' short­
term debt data significantly understate the "best 
estimates" of such debt--for those major debtors 
for which best estimates exist (only Nigeria in 
Sub-Saharan Africa)--by 5 to 60 percent. Third,
45world Bank, 206-207.
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none of the estimates include either trade arrears, 
unpaid local contracts which on payment would 
result in unpaid external obligations, or--almost 
incredibly--IMF drawings [although the information 
given above in Table l does include IMF loans].
When these are added to the World Bank's estimate 
of Sub-Saharan Africa's long-term official debt 
($80 billion in 1984, up from $12 billion in 197 2) 
the probable 1984 figure amounts to about $125 
billion, and the current total external debt of the 
42 Sub-Saharan economies to the order of $130-135 
billion. This would suggest a true average debt 
service to exports ratio in the order of 35 
percent. In fact, in many cases, recorded debt 
service ratios do not bear this out for a grim 
reason--they show only payments actually made and 
therefore not include only rescheduling, but also 
arrears are not recorded and this leads to apparent 
ratios very much below their true levels.46
African governments have the responsibility of guiding 
their states toward achieving the following goals: develop
their states' economies; check human actions that contribute 
to expanding deserts; reorient agricultural policies to 
provide farmers with material means and market incentives to 
produce food self-sufficiency in addition to agricultural 
export commodities; construct adequate storage facilities for 
defense against famine; build and maintain infrastructures in 
transportation and communications; raise standards of 
education and increase its availability to all citizens;47 
increase exports; make sure that everyone has enough food for 
survival and health-maintenance; and to meet a host of
^Green and Griffiths-Jones, 212.
47According to UNESCO's report entitled Litereary Targets in .the 
international Development Strategy. 19.23. (New York: UNESCO, 1979), there
are 28 million illiterate people in Nigeria aged 15 years and above; 17 
million in Ethiopia; 12 million in Egypt; and 99 million throughout the 
rest of Africa. This adds up to 156 million illiterate people and close 
to one fourth of Africa's total population.
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expectations of many different ethnic, regional, religious,
and economic groups that are often in conflict with each
other. As already shown, African governments are
additionally burdened with extremely high external debts, the
continuance of circumstances which increase these debts
yearly, and the need to borrow still more.
The problems of African governments are worsened by the
fact that very few of them, if any, benefit from widespread
legitimacy among their populations. The high frequency of
civil wars which have taken place on the African continent
since 1945 provides some evidence of a lack of legitimacy.
Even so, a more telling example of the unstable nature of
African governments is based on the immediate political needs
of politicians to take care of urban populations before
looking to matters of overall economic development, the good
of rural peoples, and the well-being of future generations.
Although the governmental bias toward urbanites was discussed
earlier in this paper, an additional reason for this
favoritism will be outlined below.
In early 1985, [President] Nimieri's government [of 
Sudan] was pressured by a U.S. withdrawal of aid, 
by the International Monetary Fund, and other 
creditors to make the usual sort of belt-tightening 
reforms. The Sudanese pound was devalued from 1.3 
to 2.5 to the dollar, and bread and petrol prices 
were raised by about 60%. In riots in late March, 
some 2,500 people were arrested and several killed.
Early demonstrations were staged by the poor and 
hungry, whom the government described as 
"vagabonds," but the demonstrations were joined by 
doctors, teachers, bankers, and judges--who were 
angry at finally being forced to pay heavily for 
government policies which had in fact favored them
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and other urban elites at the expense of the small
fanners .48
Nimieri lost his presidency and the military replaced 
him with Sadiq el Mahdi to head the executive as Prime 
Minister of Sudan.
President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was assassinated after 
the government cut back on its food subsidies for the urban 
peoples and thus permitted bread prices to rise. This is not 
to say that the assassination was entirely caused by the 
withdrawal of food subsidies, but, it might have played a 
part in the tragedy. Suffice it to say that no African 
government is completely immune to pressures exerted by urban 
peoples to have government favor their needs even if it is to 
the serious detriment of rural peoples1 welfare.
Unfortunately, it is on the improvement of incentives for 
rural peoples to produce that lies the future viability of 
many African economies. When foreign aid or loans are tied 
to policies which call for devaluing local currencies and the 
permitting of food prices to rise so that rural peoples have 
greater economic incentives and financial resources to 
produce more, the results can be politically disastrous in 
the short-term although the goals behind such policy 
requirements could be arguably correct in the long run.
Hopefully, it is fairly clear by now that with 
independence African governments inherited fundamentally 
difficult political, economic, and social circumstances which
48Timberlake, 189.
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are made more difficult by structural inequalities in their 
economic relationships with economically developed countries.
This chapter has provided background information on a 
particular interstate economic and political area of 
conflict. Chapter III will use this situation as a means for 
further developing Chapter 1 1s analysis of obstacles and 
prerequisites to cooperative behavior. The overall goal is 
to identify some decision-maker attitudes and perceptions 
prerequisite to cooperative behavior in order to make more 
clear some of the obstacles to international collaboration.
CHAPTER III
North-South Dialogue: 
Obstacles to Cooperation
The General Assembly...
Determined to promote collective economic security 
for development, in particular of the developing 
countries, with strict respect for the sovereign 
equality of each State and through the cooperation 
of the entire international community,...49
Chapter III will identify at least some of the conditions 
prerequisite to the production of a type of cooperatively - 
produced good: a collective good. After briefly explaining
what is meant by a collective good, the concept will be 
analyzed with regard to the case set up in Chapter II: the
lack of development of more equitable economic relations 
between Africa and Northern countries* developed economies. 
Again, the primary goal is not just collective goods but the 
identification of decision-maker attitudes and perceptions 
prerequisite to cooperative behavior.
Prelude to Conditions of Production
This section will contrast collective goods with private 
goods. A distinction will be made between the two in order 
to make more clear some of the reasons why a more equitable
49United Nations General Assembly, "Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States," from Basic Documents in International Law and World 
Order, eds. B. H. Weston, r . a . Falk, and A. A. D ’Amato (St. Paul, 
Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1980), 289.
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economic relationship between Africa and developed countries 
of the North is roughly classified here as a type of 
collective good. I will start with an example of two types 
of goods that have qualities which approach those of a purely 
collective good.
Example „.l: John Gerard Ruggie gives a four-fold
classification of goods and services in his article entitled
"Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration."50
Perfectly In Joint 
Divisible Supply
Possibility of Exclusion/ (1) I (2)
Appropriability of Cost I
 ..... I.. ....
Impossibility of Exclusion/ J
Nonappropriability of Cost (3) I (4)
The category he considers to most closely approximate pure 
collective goods is number 4: "jointness of supply" and
"impossibility of exclusion/nonappropriability of cost." By 
the latter term, he means it is not possible to "exclude 
others from sharing or to charge them the full cost of 
sharing the benefits of the good."51 An additional aspect of 
this good should be recognized here: It is also not possible 
to fully exclude oneself or others from any harmful aspects 
or to seek full compensation for damages resulting from a 
good produced by others or oneself.
50J. G. Ruggie, "Collective Goods and Future International
Collaboration," American Political Science Review, vol. 66 (1972): 888.
51Ibid., 887 .
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Decreased economic inequalities in North-South relations 
(if it comes about) will require certain actions of present 
generations which may entail some sacrifices in the degree of 
freedom of choice presently enjoyed by economic decision­
making entities (individuals, companies, intergovernmental 
and private organizations, governments). The costs of such 
actions, if taken, will be borne by present generations more 
so than by future generations and many of the benefits 
accruing from such actions will be received by future 
generations more so than by those of the present. Exactly 
who receives what amount of costs from present economic and 
political adjustments cannot be controlled by international 
and domestic market economies or by governments. Nor can the 
amount of benefit received by individuals and organizations 
as a result of decreased economic inequalities in North-South 
relations be completely controlled by markets or governments.
An example which Ruggie gives for this category of good 
is Large-Scale Climate Modification. Should such a 
technology be developed, the benefits and/or detriments of 
its use could not be made perfectly divisible and excludable 
among users and receivers.
With regard to Ruggie's classification scheme, this 
chapter will be concerned primarily with (1) the production 
of any collective good that requires the participation of two 
or more decision-making units (i.e. individuals, 
organizations, states) and, as given at the start of this 
section, (2) the production of a specific collective good:
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more equitable economic relations between Sub-Saharan Africa 
and Northern countries with developed economies. Therefore, 
the interest here applies to all four of Ruggie1s categories 
to varying degrees--even number 1 which supposedly describes 
goods with purely private characteristics. To be presented in 
the course of this chapter is the theory that no good is 
purely private if full user and opportunity costs of its 
development or extraction, acquisition, use, and disposal or 
termination are weighed into a description of the good.52 
How it relates to the potential production of more equitable 
North-South relations will be discussed, also.
Example 2: Thoughts and nonphysical qualities can be
collectively experienced. Thus, thoughts and ideas can be 
pure collective goods, although, even in the domain of ideas, 
there is a characteristic of relativity whereby certain ideas 
are not universally shared. Perhaps an illustration of such 
conditions is given in the following statement. "A universal 
theology is impossible, but, a universal experience is 
entirely possible.1,53 In other words, the actualities of love 
and trust can be universally shared even though their 
perception and expression will be as varied as the 
individuals experiencing them. They are not consumed or 
broken down when experienced so they at least have the 
quality of "jointness of use." In a somewhat similar way, we
52Disposal would apply to material goods. Termination involves 
services.
33a rmirse in Miracles (Tiburon, California: Foundation for Inner
Peace, 197 6).
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can all experience illusional constructs resulting in hatred 
or ignorance (surely only to a limited extent or there would 
be nothing but chaos).
Sociologist Georg Simmel claimed that love, virtue, 
knowledge, or power of any kind is an extreme experience or 
condition and its expression creates conditions which 
generate their opposites.54 On the surface, it would seem 
that he described life as static: every move in one
direction creates a reactive move in its opposite direction 
with all forces canceling out or "balancing" each other to a 
static condition. However, Simmel stated further that the 
conflict inherent to opposing forces can be constructive as 
well as destructive which implies the possibility of a 
dominant movement of forces in some culturally desired 
direction thereby causing change. Political theorist Hans J. 
Morgenthau asserts the possibility of significant change in a 
balance-of-power political system.55 Both theorists seem to 
say that conflict is not necessarily destructive.
If Morgenthau and Simmel are correct (assuming that I 
fairly express some of their views), then the conflict 
existing between the economic goals and desires of developed 
and undeveloped states should not be considered a situation
54Georg Simmel, "Conflict as Sociation," from sociological Theory. 5th 
ed., eds. Lewis A. Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (New York: MacMillan
Publishing Co., 1982) 175-178. "The Dyad and the Triad," from 
Sociological Theory. 45-52. Doyle Paul Johnson, Sociological Theory; 
Classical Founders and Contemporary Perspectives (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1981), 246-288.
55Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. 5th ed. (New York: 
Knopf, 197 9).
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incapable of eventually producing an economic betterment of 
all parties involved. However, even in the present, the 
conflict need not be viewed simplistically as a clash or even 
a "war” of economic interests (from which must emerge victors 
and vanquished) or as a balance or imbalance of antagonistic 
powers as it could be regarded if the units of our analysis 
included only individual interests "defined in terms of 
power. "56
LDC•s struggle to defend their "right" to development
and their "right" to demand that DCs, firstly, refrain from
further exploitation of their own position of strength vis a
vis the LDCs and, secondly, assist the economically poor
countries in programs of development. In addition to the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties (the quotation at the
start of this chapter is taken from this document), two
United Nations resolutions created by the General Assembly
are especially representative of demands for a "right" to
development: the 197 4 Declaration on the Establishment of a
New international Economic Order (NIEO) and the Programme of
Action on the Development (1974) of a NIEO.
we, the Members of the United Nations,...
Solemnly proclaim our united determination to work 
urgently for the establishment of a new 
international economic order based on equity, 
sovereign equality, interdependence, common 
interest and co-operation among all States, 
irrespective of their economic and social systems 
which shall correct inequalities and redress
56.»The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way- 
through the landscape of international politics is the concept of 
interest defined in terms of power." -Morgenthau, Politics Among 
Nations, 5.
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existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate 
the widening gap between the developed countries 
and ensure steadily accelerating economic and 
social development and peace and justice for 
present and future generations,.. .57
DCs, on the other hand, are in a relative position of 
strength and current politicians and governments are occupied 
with maximizing the economic well-being of current 
populations and constituencies. They may regard United 
Nations General Assembly resolutions such as the NlEOs and 
the C harter of Economic Rights and Duties of States as the 
"soft law" of international development, because the 
obligations created are not yet "hard" or binding. Rich 
states may finance development of poor states at their 
discretion, not according to any obligation fixed by 
international law. In other words, soft law obligations are 
considered to carry moral authority but not yet legal 
authority. Even if an international consensus on the 
existence of legal authority was now present, developed 
states are well aware that they cannot be coerced into 
complying with any such laws. And, as Morgenthau advised, we 
have a good notion of why efforts such as the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS III) have 
not yet met with success. A few powerful states do not see 
such a convention as in their own best interests.
57United Nations General Assembly, “Declaration on the Establishment of 
a New international Economic Order,“ 1 May 1974; "Programme of Action on 
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order," 1 May 1974, 
from Basic? Documents. 273-288.
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11 it is true that all political phenomena inevitably 
reduce to the balancing of interests that are opposed to some 
degree and that there is always an unavoidable opposition of 
forces, then how will "needed" cooperative behavior among 
peoples and states be developed, much less maintained from 
one generation to the next? Perhaps their theories do give 
meaningful description of why there is nonproduction of 
needed collective goods such as international peace, clean 
water courses, unpolluted air, protected watersheds, or more 
equitable North-South economic relations.
It is obvious that actions have intended and unintended 
effects. Less apparent is how the aforementioned fact 
relates to the question of private and collective goods, is 
ownership of any property or right exclusively private if the 
consequences of both ownership in itself and use of what is 
owned are productive of collective benefits or collective 
ills?
The markets of the world economy are believed to 
function, to some extent, according to notions of "free 
trade" and the "right" of each participant to enter and 
compete for shares of markets according to its own strengths 
in production and innovation. Even if this is true, some 
states are more equal in their basic economic rights than 
others. Playing by the "rules" of a world market economy is 
all well and good if a player already enjoys a position 
favored by the "rules" (at least in relation to the 
circumstances of others). Even if there could be gained a
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universal consensus on the existence of an individual "right” 
of any state to compete in world markets as best it can and 
as intensely as the "market will allow," it would still be 
true and generally recognized that the possession of 
individual rights and their exercise or nonexercise will 
unavoidably contribute to collective benefits and/or 
collective ills.
Should we then ask what are the full opportunity and 
user costs accruing to a state (or group of states) which 
uses its dominant position in the world economy to maximize 
its self-perceived interests even to the point of preventing 
other states from gaining at least enough of a market "share" 
to meet their citizens' basic survival needs? From the 
perspective of the dominant state (or states), is there any 
self-interested reason or set of reasons for being concerned 
with the preceding question if the state cannot be coerced by 
the disadvantaged states into modifying its behavior? To be 
extreme for a moment, is there, for the sake of "self- 
interest," a compelling reason for weighing into any state's 
calculations of self-interest the well-being of other states? 
This begs a further question: Can the good of any entity,
let alone a state, be considered separately from the good of 
other entities in its environment? Is private good and 
private interest, whether defined in terms of power or some 
other parameter, ever truly private?
For the sake of clarity, a look will be taken at some 
characteristics of very simple goods such as articles of
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clothing or units of food which Ruggie would classify as the 
most private of goods (or at least possessing the least 
portion of collective-good qualities).
The collective good aspects of clothing or food are 
"negligible” for any one good. However, if we ignore the 
small and perhaps undiscemible components of phenomena, then 
we may deny ourselves the opportunity to perceive the nature 
of goods, production, and ownership. This is similar to 
drops of water in an ocean; single votes in a Presidential 
election; the personalities of all the individuals directly 
involved with the UNCLOS III; or the basic survival needs of 
each malnourished, undernourished, unsheltered, unemployed, 
and un- or poorly-educated individual in Africa. Any one 
unit by itself will not determine the characteristics of 
ocean, election results, the outcome of UNCLOS, or the 
world's present and future economic order, but that does not 
mean we can dismiss the aspects of unitary parts and still 
fully understand the nature of qualities that emerge from 
aggregations of the parts.
Goods that Ruggie would place in category 1 of his 
classification scheme are supposed to be purely private or 
very close to being so ("perfectly divisible with possibility 
of exclusion/appropriability of costs"). Even so, they may 
have qualities that often prorrpt a need for cooperation to 
regulate and mitigate unintended disservice flowing from 
production, acquisition, use, and/or disposal of such private 
goods. The nature of these goods may cause us to try to
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"bring to bear various efficiency criteria, such as economies 
of scale [or questions of legal and/or economic equity], and 
therefore seek the collaborative production of a particular 
good or service. Thus, simply in order to be able to do what 
it cannot now do, or do more, or more efficiently what it is 
already doing, a state may enter into international 
arrangements facilitating such desires."58 If we consider the 
aggregate effect of user and opportunity costs of use of a 
"purely private" good by many individual actors (whether it 
can be quantified or not), then we could say that there is no 
purely private good since every action concerned with the 
development, acquisition, use, disuse, and disposal or 
termination of any good (or right) produces collective and 
private service or disservice. The consequences are 
collectively and privately received.
The foregoing examination of certain qualities of 
"private" and "collective" goods serves as a basis for 
determining conditions necessary for the production of a 
collective good such as more equitable North-South economic 
relations. It indicates also some of the reasons for the 
world community's failure to produce certain collective goods 
like the eradication of hunger, or steady increases in the 
economic development of poor nations, or the end of the 
nuclear arms race.
58Ruggie, 8 88.
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Before outlining some conditions necessary to the 
production of collective goods (in the section below entitled 
"Process"), the next two sections take a look at what 
stimulates some people to participate in the production of 
collective goods. These reasons are actually part of the 
decision-maker attitudes and perceptions listed in Chapter I 
but discussed in a different light.
Stimulus_to Participation in Producing a Collective Good
(A) Visibility of private gain.
The private good aspects of some collective goods are 
more easily perceived than those of others. The creation of 
a government-supported system of law and national defense are 
collective goods which every society tries to produce. 
Endeavors in these areas are relatively more successful than 
in the production of an international regime for access to 
and use of ocean resources, environmental protection, 
publicly insured medical services, or a New International 
Economic Order.
A little consideration of what stimulates some people to 
participate in the production of collective goods that 
require what appears to be a private cost may give insight 
into what is necessary for our society's long-term 
realization of needed collective goods.
If the private, material benefits flowing to any one 
person from such services as another person's not littering 
or maintaining one's automobile in order to keep its
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polluting emissions at a minimum, or contributing food to a 
program created to provide relief to victims of famine in 
Africa, are "negligible," then what causes some to work at 
providing services of this kind? Indeed, people like Mother 
Teresa of the Missionaries of Charity, St. Bernadette of 
Lourdes, Mohandas Gandhi, and Martin Luther King Jr. can be 
perceived as people who were or are in the business of 
producing collective goods at the expense of their own 
private well-being. However, the makers of "heroic" 
sacrifices do not perceive their actions as a complete 
personal loss since they identify their own benefit as being 
a part of others' well-being. Furthermore, they define life 
and their own nature in a manner that considers the work they 
do as more of a private gain than a private loss.
One of the important conclusions to glean from these 
examples is that participation in the provision of collective 
goods depends on private-good characteristics of collective 
goods becoming increasingly discernable and appreciable. For 
example, as the technology of the more "developed" nations 
has increasingly made available many near-shore ocean seabed 
minerals, landlocked states and LDCs have sought to prevent 
loss of a share in these resources to unilateral national 
claims (of states with coastlines) by attempting to join 
together and voice their own claims to some portion of said 
resources. The UNCLOS negotiations were the result and they 
lasted for over a decade before a multilateral convention was 
finalized in 1982.
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The United States and some other important Northern 
countries have not signed the convention. The entire UNCLOS 
III effort was viewed by LDCs as a testing ground for 
attempts at trying to put in place, later on, some portions 
of conventions like the NlEOs which are far more politically 
controversial. The NIEO conventions require greater changes 
in North-South economic relations than does the UNCLOS III 
convention.
(B) Fear or Desire Stimulus.
The two stimuli are (1) the desire for the benefits to 
be derived from obtaining a needed collective good and (2) 
the fear of the ill effects of partial or complete 
nonexistence of a needed collective good. The former could 
be thought of as constituting an aggressive feedback 
mechanism that works on decision-making processes. It has an 
inherent forward momentum which becomes stronger with time 
and accumulated successes. The latter could be thought of as 
comprising a passive feedback mechanism. It is more 
reactionary.
Attitudes and emotions of seeking and desire are more 
conducive to an entity*s ability to maximize use of available 
resources than are the emotions of fear or anxiety and the 
attitude of being passive.59 Over time, the latter attitude 
and emotional states will create stress-related physiological
59Erich Fromm, To Have or to Be (New York: Harper and Row, 197 6). The
Heart of Man; The Genius for ftood and Evil (New York: Harper and Row,
1964).
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damage.60 Psychological studies of learning show that 
moderate anxiety may facilitate the learning of simple tasks. 
This might suggest that the reactionary feedback mechanism 
fostered by reliance upon the fear stimulus could generate 
attempts at production of needed collective goods. However, 
though moderate anxiety has been observed to facilitate the 
learning of simple tasks, such an emotional state (along with 
the consequent physiological conditions) also proves to be 
damaging to attempts at learning difficult functions.61 A 
fearful attitude puts constraints upon a decision-maker's 
ability to behave in his/her "best" interests with regard to 
acquired information. One of the primary detrimental effects 
that anxiety can have upon learning is to reduce a person’s 
ability to discriminate clearly among alternatives and 
phenomena.
In the case of American and Soviet relations, fear and 
mistrust can be seen as motivations for a "peace" between the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. resulting from their mutual policies of
^Psychologists distinguish between the terms "anxiety," "fear," and 
"stress." Fear is considered a more intense emotional reaction than 
anxiety and is associated with relatively specific stimuli. Stress 
includes both fear and anxiety and is further associated with the 
development of physical conditions. I use the term fear simply as being 
any aversion to something, someone, or some situation and is manifested 
in various forms and degress of intensity which psychologists have 
labelled as "stress", "anxiety", and "fear."
61 John F. Hall, An Invitation to Learning and Memory (Boston: Allyn and
Bacon, Inc., 1982), 80-82. Gordon H. Boser and Ernest R. Hilgard, 
Theories of Learning. 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, inc., 1981), 109-112. Roger M. Tarpy and Richard E. Mayer, 
Foundations of Learning and Memory (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman
and Co., 1978), 161-163. J. M. Darley, S. Glucksber, L. J. Kamin, R. A. 
Kinchla, "Human Motivation and Emotion," chapter 11 from Psychology. 2nd 
ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 322-354.
Darley et al., "Stress and Coping," chapter 15 from Psychology. 445-466.
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developing and maintaining offensive military capabilities 
sufficiently great and indefensible so as to deter aggressive 
military behavior on the part of the other. However, fear 
and mistrust can be seen also as causes of an arms race which 
increasingly raises the probability of armed conflict. Until 
late 1987 (when a major nuclear arms reduction agreement was 
concluded between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.) the failure of 
the two countries to successfully slow or stop their arms 
race, let alone to reduce overall arms supplies, is a modem 
example of states failing to produce a collective good that 
is not only needed by both parties but consciously desired by 
both.
Jean Jacques Rousseau's Stag Hunt fable is a classic 
example of how fear can destroy or prevent production of or, 
at least, participation in the production of a needed and 
desired collective good. According to the fable, five 
hunters desire to catch a stag but can do so only if they 
combine all their resources. This calls for a high degree of 
trust. One of the hunters sees a hare which he is almost 
certain he can capture by his own efforts. He is faced with 
a decision to either pursue the hare and obtain it for 
himself or continue to help his "partners" hunt the stag.
The second choice would guarantee a good portion of food for 
all. The first choice gives food only to him and destroys 
the group's ability to get the stag. This hunter will still 
obtain less with the hare than with his fifth of the stag 
which is the greater goal but entails more risk of failure.
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The hare will bring less reward to the hunter who catches it 
and no reward to the others (they are even worse off), but, 
pursuit of the hare has relatively little risk of failure 
because success does not depend on the actions of others. In 
the conclusion of Rousseau’s story, the hunter which spotted 
the hare defected from the group's stag hunt and pursued the 
hare.
Rousseau's fable is a vivid illustration of two 
different types of orientations which can work against each 
other: a fear of something and a desire for something else.
The hunter who defected from the stag hunt feared the 
potential failure of the group's efforts more than he desired 
and trusted in the potential success of the joint endeavor.
His distrust of the results of cooperation dominated any 
prior willingness to take higher risks for higher gains.
Until the recent nuclear arms reduction treaty between 
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R (December 1987), the failure of 
these two states to develop arms control may be partly 
explained by the passive feedback mechanism of fear working 
on decision-making activities of both states. Each knows 
that war is mutually destructive and that each possesses 
enough "fire-power" and sufficiently diversified and 
effective delivery systems to make escape from a retaliatory 
strike impossible. Each country's population is held 
hostage. Yet, each continues to build because both fear that 
to do otherwise is to "open a window of vulnerability," to
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appear weaker, and to invite damaging response.62 The "peace" 
they provide through Deterrence is precarious and incomplete 
because the decision-making processes of both sides involve 
efforts to attain peace largely out of fear of war. Learned 
helplessness could be assessed as another damaging phenomenon 
occurring in the case of failed attempts to develop some form 
of arms control. Psychologists and sociologists have been 
shown that when people experience a rather consistent 
inability to affect the outcome of events, they learn to 
expect failure. This learned expectation prevents the 
acquisition of other knowledge or behavior patterns that 
would help in gaining greater control of the feared 
situation. Thus, a learning deficit is developed.63
The fear stimulus is less efficient as an aid to 
production since almost always it requires some level of 
occurrence of ill effects. Recognition of it, however, is 
useful to making operational a collective/private good 
perspective on the probability of attempts at cooperative 
behavior. It obviously helps in predicting when people will 
embark upon collective-good production. One has to determine 
conditions and factors that will create (among potential
62It could be the case that the interstate tensions are largely a hoax 
to cover up a shared fear of a stronger third party and a justification 
to citizens of each state for building up arsenals overly-developed for 
defense against each other, yet, perhaps strong enough to face down the 
third party. The third party would be, of course, aliens from space!
You can laugh now; a little breather.
63D. S. Hirohito and M. E. P. Seligman, "Generality of Learned 
Helplessness," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 31 (1975): 
311-327. M. E. P. Seligman, Hplr^lpssness (Charles Scribners' Sons,
1975).
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participants) a consensus of fear for certain ill effects to 
be incurred from nonproduction of a collective good. The bad 
private consequences must become evident, eminent, and 
perhaps even occurring to some degree. There must be a 
consensus that abeyance of privately received ills can be 
affected only through cooperative efforts.
The application of this analysis to Africa's economic 
and political relations with developed countries of the North 
will be given in the next section.
Required ..Conditions fox. Production
Every potential participant in the production of what 
they consider to be a needed good, but which requires 
cooperation, "buys" into the process by relinquishing some 
degree of independence. The inevitable medium of exchange is 
some portion of each participant's freedom of decision-making 
sovereignty over its own behavior and resources. Each 
participant will lose necessarily some flexibility in the use 
of "its" resources in the "sale" of some measure of 
sovereignty over its own decision-making functions. Again, 
these conditions apply to goods that require cooperation. In 
this case, it can be said of the producers (or at least those 
trying to produce) that they are buyers also.
In the simple cases of a producer cartel and J. J. 
Rousseau's Stag-and-Hare allegory, the forces creating supply 
of the collective good completely comprise the demanding 
market as well. With the case of environmental protection,
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however, participants in the production of a healthy 
environment do not make up the total demand. "Free" riders 
exist who need or could benefit from the collective good but 
do not get involved in its realization from (1) being unaware 
of the nature of said good and of what its production and 
maintenance requires, or (2) perceiving their own potential 
effort as inconsequential (please see the Appendix for an 
analysis of the Free Rider perspective), or (3) not caring 
one way or another.
In the situation of economic relations between African 
states and the world*s economically dominant states, 
participants in the creation of a more equitable economic 
relationship do not comprise the total demand at the 
individual level of analysis. Individuals, companies, and 
multinational corporations from both sets of countries may 
continue for some time to pursue goals and/or behave in ways 
that do not support efforts to create more equitable North- 
South economic relations and, yet, may benefit from any 
progress achieved by others toward that end. Such persons 
would be considered "free riders" in this scenario. They may 
not contribute to the production of the collective good of 
more equitable North-South economic relations. They may even 
knowingly oppose it. Yet, they would probably derive 
appreciable benefit from a world in which less poverty and 
underdevelopment produced more political stability, expanded 
commercial markets with fewer investment risks (with 
developing countries becoming more economically developed and
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feeling capable of permitting greater foreign investment; 
less occurrence of nationalizing companies or appropriating 
some portion of foreign capital), and an overall reduction of 
domestic and international tensions or conflicts.64 An 
example is the fact that individuals guiding the policies of 
multinational corporations too often behave in a way that 
tries to maximize short-term profits at the expense of long- 
run good relations with their host countries.
Chapter I ’s look at attitudes and perceptions which 
support the production and maintenance of collective goods 
will be examined further in the following pages.
(1) Participants must perceive direct "private" gains to 
be received from some form of cooperative behavior.
As discussed above, if a desire for possible benefits to 
be obtained is the preoccupation of an actor's thoughts, then 
it will be assumed here that behavior is predominantly 
motivated by the desire stimulus. If the main characteristic 
of an actor's participation in collaborative endeavors is 
fear that present and/or future private good will be 
endangered or definitely injured via consequences of 
nonexistence of some cooperatively-produced good, then it 
will be assumed here that behavior is largely driven by the 
fear stimulus. As pointed out earlier, an example of this 
latter orientation is given in past U.S. and U.S.S.R. efforts
64However, the news media seems to be discovering, very slowly, more and 
more ways in which governments and various multinational corporations 
make significant monetary gains from supplying one or all sides in 
inter- and intra-state conflicts.
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to develop some kind of arms control. Activities in this 
regard have been prompted more by a fear of economic and 
political damages resulting from heightened tensions between 
the countries as well as the destruction that would occur 
from armed conflict than by a love of the other's culture and 
peoples and a desire to realize possible benefits derived 
from a mutual sharing of cultural and technological 
strengths.
Another example of the fear stimulus predominating in 
foreign policies is the relationship between Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the U.S.S.R., and the U.S. Since the start of the 
Cold War and the Truman Doctrine of Containment (of the 
"spread of communism" and any Soviet expansionist notions), 
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have continually competed with each 
other for political influence in countries around the world. 
Each attempts to use economic and/or military aid as a method 
of gaining influence with governments. Developing countries 
are considered to be very vulnerable to economic seduction 
and coercion.
Politicians of Sub-Saharan Africa realize the potential 
amount of economic aid the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could give and 
are willing to accept aid from either state provided that the 
"strings attached" can be accepted without endangering their 
own political positions, careers, the interests of their 
supporters, and the welfare of their citizens. The order of 
priorities will vary of course with the individual 
politician. Table 3 lists African states according to
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perceived alignments with either the "West" or the "East” as 
of mid-1982. Namibia is left out of the source for this 
table.
Table,3
African states believed to be aligned with the non-communist 
"West," the communist "East," or non-aligned.
West
Mauritania
Mali
Niger
Chad
Sudan
Dj ibouti
Somalia
Senegal
Gambia
Burkina Faso
Sierra Leone
Liberia
Rwanda
Burundi
Zimbabwe
South Africa
Swaziland
Egypt
Morocco
Cote d’Ivoire 
Ghana 
Togo 
Benin 
Nigeria 
Cameroon 
Gabon 
Zaire
Central African 
Republic 
Uganda 
Kenya 
Malawi 
Zambia 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Tunisia
Equatorial Guinea
East
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Angola
Congo
Libya
Non-aligned
Guinea
Tanzania
Algeria
Western Sahara
Source: Michael Kidron and Dan Smith, The War Atlas.
Armed Conflict-Armed Peace (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1983), map no. 16.
Mali, Guinea, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Libya, 
Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia are listed in Kidron and 
Smith’s War Atlas as having changed from "West to East" or 
"East to west" alignment at least once.
It is very debatable as to whether the actual political 
influence of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in Africa is as great as 
each likes to believe. The fact remains, though, that each 
believes their efforts to gain influence are important to 
their individual security (against each other) as well as
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productive of real results in Africa. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. 
do this largely out of fear of what might happen were they to 
do otherwise.
J. G. Ruggie has stated, very clearly, two conditions
that make cooperation necessary between states.
A state may tend toward greater international 
organization of an activity, or international 
performance of a task or resolution of a 
problem,...to the extent of which it discovers the 
inadequacy (or lack) either of one or of both of 
two resources. These are: (1) physical
capabilities, which may be inadequate simply 
because there are not enough of them, or which may 
be irrelevant because the extant definition of 
property rights place the source of the problem 
within the jurisdiction of another; and (2) 
knowledge of cause/effect relations underlying 
either problems or solutions.
...Thus, the inadequacy (or lack) of either 
capabilities or techniques, or of both, may lead a 
state to seek to cooperate with others.65
it is easy to see how this argument fits the case of 
African requests for aid and assistance from the North, what 
is there in this perspective, however, that may cause 
countries of the North to see a need of their own to 
cooperate with programs designed to reduce the decline in 
terms of trade experienced by African states? Why should 
they gradually release African states from some portion of 
their external debts as was done by the U.S. with the war 
debts of France, England, Belgium, and the Netherlands after 
the post-World-War-II programs of economic buildup and 
recovery?
65Ruggie, 87 8.
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The U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain, France, West Germany, and
Japan all import metals from Africa which are important to
military products. As a whole, Africa is rich in metals and
minerals that highly industrialized societies seem unable to
do without. Knowing this, should African states work to form
cartels for raw materials among themselves and other
developing countries similar to the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Organization of Arab
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)? Given the information
presented in Chapter II of this paper, it is arguable that
African states are in no good position to threaten developed
countries at this time. Even if such cartels can be formed
in the near future, another characteristic of North-South
relations would act strongly against any possibilities of
success from the efforts.
That the North still represents a group of dominant 
nations, both in economic and in military terms, is 
evident. On the other hand, its growing deficit of 
raw materials appears to give the militarily 
inferior Southern countries an employable economic 
weapon. Although a growing resource dependence on 
the South will not necessarily mean that the 
balance has been decisively tipped against the 
North, it may mean that there is higher probability 
that states of the North will use force to assure 
access to resources in times of stress.66
Efforts to gain increased North-South cooperation will be 
more politically and economically practical in the long-run 
than policies of confrontation.
66Ruth W. Arad and Uzi B. Arad, "North-South: The Mobilization of 
Resource Power," from Sharing global Resources (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1979), 29.
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(2) Private good must be perceived as at least partly 
dependent upon the private good of others who also need the 
good(s) to be produced via cooperation.
The example given in Chapter I is a military alliance. 
Each ally will benefit from every other ally's own continued 
or increased strength (provided that increasing strength does 
not become feared or become a new and real threat to alliance 
members).
Another example is the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action for
African economic development drawn up by the Organization of
African Unity. It has, at the heart of its logic, the tenet
that the promotion of the private good of each and every
African state is in the best interests of each and every
African state. The plan calls for the development of local
(state) self-sufficiency and the growth of regional self-
sufficiency to come about as a corollary goal.
To lay a durable foundation for internally 
generated, self-sustained processes of development 
and economic growth based on the twin principles of 
national and regional self-reliance. To bring 
about self-sufficiency in food and a diminishing 
dependence on exports and on expatriate technical 
assistance. To create an African Economic 
Community--i.e., an economically unified Africa.67
As long as African states pursue modernization similar
to that of northern countries, the Lagos Plan's goal of
partially removing Africa from the world trading community
can never be attained. Entry into world economic markets and
67Robert S. Browne and Robert J. Cummings, "Prospects for Long-Term 
African Change: The Lagos Plan of Action versus the Berg Report," from
Food in Sub-Saharan Africa. 354.
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industrialization must be done on the terms of those who 
dominate world markets and technology. Those two goals will 
not be achieved without first gaining the cooperation of 
Northern states (or the most influential of them) in 
achieving this goal for Africa--or at least in not 
interfering with the goal. Africa needs Northern aid and 
assistance in the present to get its current goals and, 
unfortunately for Africa, it is deeply into financial debt to 
the Northern states and/or financial organizations primarily 
based in Northern states and economies. As expressed above 
under condition #1, if Africa simply decided to put certain 
commodities precious to the North out of the North's reach or 
to use them as an economic weapon, then Africa probably would 
bring onto itself retaliation from the North in sufficient 
intensity and form as to destabilize African governments.
The Lagos Plan assumes also that "African leaders will 
be willing to.impose the necessary austerity entailed by 
delinkage [from the economies of the North], and to live with 
the discontent precipitated thereby [and that the] African 
public will accept this austerity and will rally to the 
call."68 The weakness of these assumptions was demonstrated 
in Chapter II of this paper. Most African governments do not 
enjoy the degree of legitimacy among their populations 
necessary to permit policies that would begin to put western 
imported goods out of reach of African populations.
68Browne and Cummings, 355.
75
(3) There must be an attitude of willingness to accept a 
degree of dependence on other participants in a cooperative 
endeavor.
As discussed in Chapter I, this prerequisite to 
cooperation contains several conditions. All participants 
must perceive the commitment of fellow producers to the 
production of a mutually desired collective good as being 
genuine.
The Lagos Plan of Action assumes the presence of this 
third condition. The following phrase appears over and over 
in the 1980 document: "We commit ourselves, individually and
collectively, on behalf of our governments and peoples, 
to..."69 Cartel's like OPEC and OAPEC will fall apart when 
this third condition is no longer met.
With regard to accepting some degree of political 
interdependence, several points can be made about the North- 
South case. In the sense of reducing inequalities in North- 
South economic relations, Northern states must be willing to 
accept greater dependence on a relationship in which 
developing countries have more control over their primary 
resources. For the sake of long-term development of 
undeveloped economies, Northern states must be less willing 
to exercise their military and economic advantages as a means
690rganization of African Unity, "Plan of Action for the Implementation 
of the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa," from
U.S. Technical_.Assistance to African Regional Economic Tnsti tut ions» An
Assessment (Appendix i). Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
98th Cong., 2nd sess., 1984, p. 24.
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of coercively maintaining access to primary resources in 
third-world countries.
It is possible to argue for a long-run view of profit 
maximization for Northern economies in this regard. Third 
world markets for Northern products and services will grow 
larger on the whole with increased income levels of peoples 
of the third world. This is a simple and straightforward 
argument, but, is probably true. A long-run political 
benefit for Northern states resulting from reduced poverty in 
LDCs will certainly be that political environments become 
more stable. This will mean less unpredictability for 
foreign policymakers and analysts of the Northern DCs.
Chapter I addressed a possible obstruction to initiation 
of collective-good production as coming from the fact that 
cooperative behavior replaces, to some degree, competitive 
behavior. This demands a willingness to incur some measure 
of shared sovereignty over decision-making which means (a) a 
loss of some individual freedom, and (b) an amount of shared 
vulnerability.
(a) Loss of Some Individual Freedom (see Chapter I for
explanation).
The Lagos Plan of Action calls for the development of an 
African Economic Community similar to the European Economic 
Community. This will require a great deal of regional 
cooperation not only in economic matters but in security 
issues as well. The EEC relies on the provision of its
security largely through its membership in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the U.S.'s support of the 
defense treaty. An African Economic Community will firstly 
be required to have few if any border conflicts. The 
Organization for African Unity is aware of this requirement 
and continually tries to make of itself a neutral forum for 
the working out of regional conflicts. But, with regard to 
North-South relations, how will an African Economic Community 
relate to the two Northern superpowers? Will it try to 
achieve a sort of non-alignment or ally itself strategically 
with one or the other of the superpowers? Most of the 
external debts of African states are owed to organizations 
tied to or from the "West."
(b) Shared Vulnerability/Security Cost (see Chapter I
for explanation).
States of Sub-Saharan Africa will have to deal with the 
fact that the Northern countries are extremely sensitive to 
bhe nature of this condition of cooperative behavior. The 
formation of cartels or simply the attempt to form cartels 
makes Northern states and organizations very defensive. The 
EEC fears growing dependency on Third-world suppliers of 
commodities and periodically seeks to renew old protectionist 
trade policies against other economic regions. It has been 
the U.S. primarily which has moderated EEC policies. If an 
emerging African Economic Community adopts policies that 
cause the U.S. to assume increasingly defensive postures,
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then Africa can expect a quick erosion of the current status 
of its relations with the EEC.
Of all conditions outlined above, cartels usually only 
satisfy condition #1 and fall apart as a result of lacking 
some or all of the others.
The international balance-of-power policy of Deterrence 
is used to assure the absence of war. It is dependent only 
upon satisfaction of requirement #1. Absence of any need for 
Deterrence as well as the arms race which naturally develops 
from it, is mainly contingent upon fulfillment of the second 
requirement (though all production conditions must be met 
eventually for secure and lasting peace).
with North-South economic relations, I believe that all 
of the above conditions must eventually be met for the 
support of sustained economic development among LDCs and the 
reform of unfavorable terms of trade for the Southern states. 
However, the visibility of costs and benefits to DCs of the 
nonproduction or production of economic strength in LDCs is 
not yet appreciable to or even acknowledged by decision­
makers of or based in the DCs.
There have been some North-South cooperative attempts at 
improving the developing countries' side of the economic 
relationship. Most notably are the Lome Conventions and the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).
The European Communities arrangements with African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific states [ACP], which replaced 
former colonial preference schemes, were formalized 
under the first Yaounde Convention of 1963 and are 
now enshrined in the Lome Convention, the third of
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which was signed in 1984. The STABEX compensatory 
financing facility is a principal feature of the 
Lome Convention. Other features are the free access 
for most ACP goods into the EC and the European 
Development Fund, which administers foreign aid to 
ACP countries.70
Under the GSP, developing countries; exports to 
markets in industrial countries enjoy tariff 
reductions or exemptions. The scheme has had 
little effect on exports, however, partly because 
its product coverage is so limited. Imports from 
beneficiaries are only a fraction of the total 
import of industrial countries.71
Although the economic effects of the Lome 
Convention are hard to quantify, there are several 
reasons for thinking that they are relatively 
small: first, preference margins are slim; second,
the main effect of most preferences seems to have 
been to divert trade rather than to boost it; 
third, market structures sometimes allow 
monopsonistic European importers to capture the 
tariff preferences; and fourth, the ACP countries 
have not always taken (or been able to take) full 
advantage of any increase in trade opportunities 
that has arisen. The last point applies 
particularly to the smallest and least developed 
countries. In return for these generally small and 
uncertain benefits, the ACP countries are bound 
into EC protectionism. Fearing the erosion of 
their preferences, they tend to oppose more 
widespread trade liberalization.72
Efforts at "cooperation” like the GSP and the Lome 
Conventions are not enough and tend to be fairly self-serving 
for some number of the Northern countries--especially the EEC 
countries.
70World Bank, 140.
71Ibid., 142.
72lbid., 144.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS
Chapter IV examines a concept of "rational" behavior in 
economic endeavors and is contrasted with the discussion of 
attitudes and perceptions given in Chapters I and III 
regarding the achievement of cooperation. The term 
"rational" is used here to mean that as we are faced with 
more than one possible choice of action, we will make choices 
that, to the best of our understanding, will be most 
supportive of self and self's goals and/or the least 
injurious to self and self's goals.
Our ability or propensity to perceive collaboration as 
legitimate and credible is affected by our concept of 
rational behavior. Facts and information we consider to be 
relevant to an analysis of our reality determine our 
rationality as well. Our assessment of what is rational and 
irrational is probably the most influential characteristic of 
our effort to "make" and perceive the world.
The above definition of rational behavior is an integral
part of a theory of economic behavior that has been taught in
economic classes for a long time in the "westernized" part of
the world; often referred to as neoclassical economic theory.
This popular approach assumes that the mechanisms of private
property and private two-party exchange can "satisfactorily"
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allocate the extraction, refinement, development, production, 
and distribution of natural and human resources among 
consumers according to their relative purchasing powers and 
preferences. Some other necessary conditions are that the 
preference orderings of consumers and the production 
processes of producers must be independent. An example of 
lack of independence on the consumer side is found in the 
effects of advertising. Its function is to bias and 
manipulate consumer preferences. Given certain price 
parameters, consumers must maximize utility according to 
income and producers must maximize profits.
Together, these profit-maximizing firms and utility- 
maximizing consumers compose competitive markets. The 
theoretical goal of this system {if, indeed, it is not the 
goal of any or all of the participants) is to attain and 
maintain, through reallocations, Pareto Optimal conditions. 
Pareto Optimality is realized if it is impossible to better 
anyone's situation without also worsening someone else's. By 
the same token, a status quo is inefficient if it is possible 
to improve the circumstances of at least one member without 
also worsening another's via reallocation.
A point worth making here is that if we can ever say 
that conditions are Pareto Optimal, we have not necessarily 
stated that the ideal set of conditions for most people has 
been attained. By definition, a society can still have rich 
and poor, prospering and suffering while being at the same
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time in a position where no person*s situation can be 
improved without making someone else*s position "worse."
A logical requirement for the realization of Pareto 
Optimality in a social environment where no one is suffering 
want while another is prospering greatly is that, among 
completely rational actors in possession of perfect 
information, there will exist a consensus of opinion as to 
what constitutes need, "worse off," and "better off." It 
further demands that Jeremy Bentham's dream of civilization 
achieving "the greatest good for the greatest number" will be 
a common goal among perfectly rational actors. This must be 
the case even if the reallocations necessary to maximize "the 
greatest good" in relation to maximizing the number of 
recipients of said good entails some sacrifice on the part of 
some actors who possess well above what they require while 
others possess appreciably less than they need.
Strictly speaking, it is impossible to maximize for two 
or more entities who share a need for something existing in a 
closed system, and who are desirous and perhaps capable of 
having all of the available "something." However, it is 
entirely possible to imagine a situation that gives maximum 
benefit to each entity in relation to the other(s). 
Furthermore, if achievement of optimal efficiency requires 
also the production of the greatest degree of equity (it is 
considered a necessity here because, otherwise, there is the 
foundation for inefficient social conflict), then it is 
essential that there be a shared set of values. The
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importance of a consensus on a system of values is emphasized 
simply because it points to one of the major impediments to 
the realization of needed cooperatively-produced goods.
Perhaps the key to our success or failure in overcoming 
our tendency to underproduce needed collective goods is 
contingent upon the values which have the broadest consensus 
among potential participants in the process of collective- 
good production. We seek what we desire and in this regard 
we are universally consistent. It is our values that 
determine what we desire and give definition to concepts such 
as need, efficiency, equity, private good, and collective 
good. The importance of this guiding factor in our behavior 
is seen in our aggregate ability to write-off the welfare of 
future generations. After all, responsibility for the good 
of the world beyond our lifetime--beyond our individual, 
physical experience--is not assessed as a component of a 
person's unitary, private good. It is considered rather as a 
contribution to society's collective good through time. The 
remark "What will future generations ever do for me" is a 
representative expression of a Free Rider perspective.73 
Inherent to such a statement is a set of values which defines 
private good in an atomistic and reductionist manner.
We "see" and "remember" events and information that, on 
the whole, support our "point of view."74 This, in addition
73See Appendix for description of the Free Rider perspective.
74Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, Illinois: 
Row, Peterson and Co., 1957). Leon Festinger, Vernon Allen, Marcia 
Braden, Lance Kirkpatrick Canon, Jon R. Davidson, Jon D. Jecker,
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to our use of incomplete information on the nature of 
ourselves and our environment, causes in us a tragic near­
sightedness. We do not have a high visibility of the costs 
of nonproduction of a needed collective good or of what 
production requires from us.
Because we do not and cannot perceive the total effects 
of any of our actions and consciously selected interests, we 
often behave as though we have little need for a serious 
regard or concern for user and opportunity costs resulting 
from our behaviors, individually and in groups, we are 
centered almost exclusively on the most obvious effects of 
our actions on ourselves and, secondly, (to the extent it 
further affects us) on those people, states, groups, 
organizations, and/or objects to which we intend the 
direction of our actions and interests.
Our near-sightedness prevents us from perceiving 
actions, interests, services, and goods as possessing and/or 
producing both private- and collective-good qualities. There 
is no purely private good because all actions are 
interconnected even if the relation is indirect, remote, and 
perhaps "negligible" to what we are able to perceive in our 
world. The belief that life is a continuum goes against a 
concept of reductionism. A reductionist perspective must 
prevent or at least work against, by its own logic, the 
satisfaction of production condition #2 listed in Chapters I
Sara B. Kiesler, Elaine Waister, Conflict, Decision, and Dissonance 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964).
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and III. If the private good of one unit can be completely 
separate from the private good of another, then it is 
possible for behavior to be oriented toward a support of 
attitudes such as Beggar-Thy-Neighbor, Buyer-Beware, Every - 
Man-For-Himself, or foreign policies such as Colonialism and 
Imperialism. This must contribute to the decline of 
cooperative endeavors and/or deterioration of the ability of 
potential participants to produce or try to produce the 
collective goods they desire.
If we maximize profit or utility as discrete, atomistic 
particles and perceive private good in a fashion whereby each 
entity's private good is separate from any other, then 
unequitable economic relations will be an inevitable result.
The internal harmony of a tree does not exist because 
each individual cell treats the other as something to compete 
against. The harmony exists because each cell fulfills 
itself, not in spite of, but in cooperation with the other 
cells in its environment. The reverse of this in the body of 
a tree, in the body of a human, in the body of an economy, in 
the body of a nation, in an international economic ''order,” 
or in relations between economically developed and 
undeveloped states is cancer.
We must maximize our profit and utility in relation to 
profit, utility, and need of other entities as well as 
ourselves. No estimation of the results of any action can be 
expected to be complete. Such "perfection" is not a 
necessary prelude to behaving in a way that gives beneficial
86
results to both self and environment. On the other hand, the 
type of perception of the world that accepts private good as 
existing in distinctly discrete units, will have to make 
rational decisions that produce aggregate ills just as 
Garrett Hardin showed in his paper entitled "Tragedy of the 
Commons.1,75
If, however, private goods are seen in a continuum (at 
least accepted as the case in theory since direct perception 
of this is not feasible) and that no person's private good 
can be maximized if someone else is suffering some form of 
deprivation, then decision-making processes can contribute to 
production of needed cooperative behavior and fit this 
orientation within a concept of rationality which demands 
that actions be taken that support the optimum health and 
continuance of an entity.
As we develop an ever-increasing consensus on a set of 
values that by definition allows individual, rational 
decisions to contribute logically to production and 
maintenance of needed collective goods, we will then be 
developing an inherent, systemic support for development and 
continuance of desired collective behavior. Any effort in 
this regard is not unrealistic and wasteful of time and 
resources, but, just the opposite.
75Garrett Hardin, "Tragedy of the Commons" in Pollutionf Resources, and 
i-hp> renvironment. eds Alain C. Enthoven and A. Myrick Freeman III (New 
York: w. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1973), 1-13.
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At this point, the analysis could be taken as a simple 
recommendation for adoption of three very old pieces of 
advice: (1) "Do unto others as you would have them do unto 
you"76;
(2) "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"77; and (3) Do 
learn to love thyself or else practice of the other two rules 
will not amount to much benefit for self or others. These 
comprise a live-and-let-live attitude toward our social and 
natural environments; obviously, a most cooperative state of 
mind and emotion.
If we do not perceive our personal good as being 
bettered in any tangible way by the "betterment" of other 
people's health and "happiness" or "well-being", then our 
attitudes and perceptions of self and world must become very 
competitive and narrowly defined. However, personal 
definitions of "happiness" and "well-being" are derived from 
personal beliefs and values which are impacted by social 
environments. How then, do we hope to achieve cooperation in 
a setting that contains many cultures, religions, forms of 
government, and economies, and in which each person's 
material and social circumstances add up to a unique position 
within humanity?
We must come to some basic set of assumptions about the 
nature of mankind on the whole. Since I desire to know what
76,1 And as ye would that man should do to you, do ye also to them 
likewise." verse 31, Chapter 6, Gospel of St. Luke from the Bible.
77verse 31, Chapter 12, Gospel of St. Mark from the Bible.
will increase the occurrence of cooperation, I make the 
following three assumptions: (1) humans desire to understand 
self and the environment both human and natural; (2) this 
desire to understand requires a willingness to attempt to 
communicate with the environment as well as reflect upon our 
own feelings and thoughts; and (3) as a species, we will 
persist in efforts to achieve communication and 
understanding.
The three assumptions given above do not have to be held 
as untrue simply because their full realization has not 
occurred in the known world. Obviously, cooperative and 
competitive motivations exist in each culture and state and 
probably within each person. There are two conditions that 
promote both competition and cooperation. One is a scarcity 
of resources needed to obtain goals. The second is the 
condition of limitation on abilities to gain and effectively 
utilize resources to achieve goals. However, if humankind 
basically desires an increase in understanding of itself and 
"life," then our species will move, on the whole, toward an 
increase in the number of members whose understanding 
includes more and more of the whole of humanity and its 
environment. If this is not a fundamental characteristic of 
humankind then life must be indeed always "nasty, brutish, 
and short," as once described by Thomas Hobbes. Why then 
bother to study the nature of cooperation and its 
manifestation? we should then study only the nature of
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competition and ways to maximize personal ability to employ 
it at the expense of competitors.
This paper concerns cooperation and its realization and, 
therefore, must accept the three assumptions about human 
nature as given above. I carefully make this point because, 
too often, researchers and writers do not acknowledge the 
most basic assumptions upon which they build their research.
If they do not, it is because (1) they do not think it 
necessary, (2) they haven’t given the matter enough thought, 
or (3) they fear the chastisement of being labelled an 
idealist. These assumptions have not been addressed in 
earlier chapters because there has been no attempt to verify 
or disprove them. They have simply been accepted as 
plausible possibilities.
Our world is a mixed bag. There are people, 
organizations, states, and cultures that wish to work with 
others to achieve a collective good and those that wish to 
spend most of their resources in competition with others. 
Self-interest can be assumed to exist within cooperative 
endeavors as well as competitive activities. It was brought 
up in Chapter III that a person can make heroic efforts on 
behalf of the benefit of others without sacrificing self- 
interest if that person's definition of what betters self- 
interest includes the benefit of others' interests.
People like Mother Teresa, Mohandas Gandhi, St. Francis 
of Assissi, and Martin Luther King Jr. define life and their 
own nature in a way that considers the work they do as more
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of a private gain than a private loss. Thus, according to 
their set of values. their behavior is efficient toward 
achieving personal goals and beneficial to self. In other 
words, they behave(d) rationally. They believe(d) their work 
to be productive of a high level of private and collective 
gain.
Self-interest should be viewed as necessary to
cooperation even though it is most often used to explain
competitive behavior. When is self-interest ever completely
absent? If there were no potential gain for self as a result
of cooperation, then why cooperate? When analyzing
individual and group behavior, use of the concept of self-
interest should be qualified by considering how broad or
narrow is the part of the human and natural environment with
which the individual or group identifies. Robert Axelrod
makes this point indirectly in his book entitled The
EyQlut ion.. _q£ . .Cooperation,.
The Cooperation Theory that is presented in this 
book is based upon an investigation of individuals 
who pursue their own self-interest without the aid 
of a central authority to force them to cooperate 
with each other. The reason for assuming self- 
interest is that it allows an examination of the 
difficult case in which cooperation is not 
completely based upon a concern for others or upon 
the welfare of the group as a whole. It must, 
however, be stressed that this assumption is 
actually much less restrictive than it appears. If 
a sister is concerned for the welfare of her 
brother, the sister’s self-interest can be thought 
of as including (among many other things) this 
concern for the welfare of her brother. But this 
does not necessarily eliminate all potential for 
conflict between sister and brother. Likewise a 
nation may act in part out of regard for the 
interests of its friends, but this regard does not
9 1
mean that even friendly countries are always able 
to cooperate for their mutual benefit. So the 
assumption of self-interest is really just an 
assumption that concern for others does not 
completely solve the problem of when to cooperate 
with them and when not to.78
Methods to be used for discovering or discerning the 
broadness or narrowness of self-interest would be the same as 
already employed by historians, political analysts, 
sociologists, and social psychologists. The precise 
methodology is not at issue here, just the focus.
If my assumptions are true regarding humanity's need for 
pursuing understanding of self and environment via self- 
reflection, communication, and exploration, then it is 
possible that with greater self- and outer-awareness comes an 
enlargement of what self-interest includes. It would begin 
to enconpass more and more of the world outside of self. The 
enlarging circles of self-interest of individuals and groups 
would begin to overlap in the sense of sharing more interests 
and values.
The possibility for increase in the number of 
individuals and groups who can appreciate each other 
intrinsically (if not appreciating all the activities and 
goals of each other), holds forth the further possibility for 
the development of common values. Common values will permit 
the development of increased communication, understanding, 
and common goals.
78Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books,
inc., Publishers) 6-7.
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We see so much conflict in our world that evidence of an 
increase in the number of people who can identify with the 
good of other people is easily unnoticed or taken for 
granted. For example, there exists ample reason to believe 
that, on the whole, there is in our world less bigotry based 
on race, nationality, or sex than existed two centuries ago. 
More and more people see a need to care about how their 
activities impact the natural environment. In the latter 
case, it can be seen how self-interest is a large part of 
this phenomenon. We begin to see that very few activities 
and goods are perfectly private in their development, 
acquisition, use, and disposal or termination, as discussed 
in Chapter ill.
Perhaps, we first recognize how activities and 
characteristics of our human and natural world affect our 
"private" interest. We notice this as part of an attitude of 
protecting and securing our private interests. It is an 
aspect of survival efforts. Then, we could take the step of 
recognizing how our "private" activities and interests impact 
our world in some way. The latter choice probably requires a 
broadening of what is included in our definition of self- 
interest. What we value must be perceived as related to, 
shared by, or common with an ever-increasing portion of the 
world outside ourselves.
Thus far in this paper, cooperation has been treated as 
desirable because the goals being addressed by potential 
participants are desirable. This approach should not be
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applied to every particular situation. "Usually one thinks 
of cooperation as a good thing.... Yet...there are 
situations in which one wants to do just the opposite. To 
prevent businesses from fixing prices, or to prevent 
potential enemies from coordinating their actions, one would 
want to turn the approach around and do the opposite of what 
would promote cooperation."79
With the example of businesses colluding in order to 
increase profits to the point of injuring the interests of 
consumers, one could take the perspective that the businesses 
have an overly narrow definition of what constitutes their 
self-interests. Their private good has not been enlarged 
enough to permit inclusion of the private good of the people 
who purchase their goods and/or services. While the 
businesses could be viewed as cooperating with each other, 
they can be viewed also as not cooperating with the entire 
human environment with which they interact. Were they to 
provide their goods or services in a way that permitted their 
consumers access without undue pain (i.e. gaining a profit 
for themselves that was acceptable to themselves and their 
consumers), then the world with which they cooperate would be 
enlarged.
In the absence of being forced by some more powerful 
agency80 to cooperate, they could make an expansion of their
79Axelrod, 125.
80The term agency is used here to indicate any individual, group, 
situation, circumstances, means or instrumentality capable of inducing a 
need for change or of authoritatively commanding change.
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cooperative efforts only if they had enlarged the part of 
their world with which they identify common interests and 
values. Their self-interests shall have been made to include 
some portion of the private interests of other members of 
their human environment.
Not all entities are involved in a process of 
appreciable change in attitude toward themselves and their 
world. In the meantime, while letting the assumed processes 
of increasing communication and understanding work away at 
social and economic divisions, what does an individual, 
group, or state do when faced with a choice between 
cooperation and competition? Axelrod developed some advice 
for reforming a situation in order to promote cooperation. 
The next few pages address certain parts of his study. His 
analysis was derived from studying the strategic setting of 
the Prisoner's Dilemma.81
Enlarge the shadow of the future. Mutual
cooperation can be stable if the future is
81The Prisoners' Dilemma itself is named for such a situation. The 
original story is that two accomplices to a crime are arrested and 
questioned separately. Either can defect against the other by 
confessing and hoping for a lighter sentence. But if both confess, 
their confessions are not as valuable. On the other hand, if both 
cooperate with each other by refusing to confess, the district attorney 
can only convict them of a minor charge. Assuming that neither player 
has moral qualms about, or fear of, squealing, the payoffs can form a 
Prisoners' Dilemma. From society's point of view, it is a good thing 
that the two accomplices have little likelihood of being caught in the 
same situation soon, because that is precisely the reason why it is to 
each of their individual advantages to double-cross the other. As long 
as the interaction is not iterated, cooperation is very difficult. That 
is why an important way to promote cooperation is to arrange that the 
same individuals will meet each other again, be able to recognize each 
other from the past, and to recall how the other has behaved until now. 
This continuing interaction is what makes it possible for cooperation 
based on reciprocity to be stable (Axelrod, 125)'. [Axelrod cites the 
following for the Prisoners' Dilemma: Luce and Raiffa 1957, 94-95].
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sufficiently important relative to the present.
This is because the players can each use an 
implicit threat of retaliation against the other's 
defection - if the interaction will last long 
enough to make the threat effective... .82
There are two basic ways of doing this: by making 
interactions more durable, and by making them more 
frequent... .83
[P]rolonged interaction allows patterns of 
cooperation which are based on reciprocity to be 
worth trying and allows them to become 
established.84
[In the case of making interaction more frequent] , 
the next interaction occurs sooner, and hence the 
next move looms larger than it otherwise would.85
Axelrod has noted two techniques that can promote more
frequent and prolonged interactions. "Concentrating
interactions" by limiting the number of individuals involved
is one method. "Hierarchy and organization are especially
effective at concentrating the interactions between specific
individuals."86 "Decomposition" of interactions into smaller
pieces is another method. He presents the examples of
breaking down bargaining into a number of more manageable
components and that of payments in business contracts being
divided into a number of smaller payments, with the business
example, the possible gain for cheating on any single payment
becomes less tempting than if there were only one lump sum.
With both examples, the implicit threat of reciprocity easily
applies.
82Axelrod, 126
83Ibid., 129.
84Ibid., 129.
85Ibid., 129.
^Ibid., 130.
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The second major category given by Axelrod is about the 
changing of payoffs to the players for cooperation or 
noncooperation. It could include both greater reward for 
cooperation and/or greater punishment for noncooperation. He 
explains the latter approach as being government's main 
function. This is similar to part of my discussion of 
government's purpose as given in pages 8-9 of Chapter I. 
Axelrod uses also the example of how informal groups such as 
gangs develop ways of promoting loyalty via the threat 
punishment for defection or betrayal.
Both scenarios depend upon there being some overarching 
agency possessing the power, will, and ability to punish any 
and all actors for defection from a cooperative endeavor, in 
the international setting of governments and economic actors, 
there does not exist any single agency capable of inflicting 
unilateral, unreciprocable injury to every single actor or to 
the entire group without also injuring its own long- and/or 
short-term interest.
Axelrod's third category is a recommendation to teach 
the players "values, facts, and skills that will promote 
cooperation."87 There are three main components within this 
approach. "Teach people to care about each other88.. .Teach 
reciprocity89... [and] improve recognition abilities."90
87Axelrod, 126.
88lbid., 134.
"ibid., 136.
90Ibid., 139.
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Axelrod gives a couple of cautions about the use of 
altruism to manipulate others actions and/or opinions. Also, 
a "selfish individual" may exploit the altruism of others.
He concludes that the safest approach is to be "altruistic to 
everyone at first, and thereafter only to those who show 
similar feelings." Both cautions are an invocation of a very 
old adage: "Fool me once, shame on you; Fool me twice,
shame on me."
In discussing the teaching of reciprocity he contrasts
two extreme approaches and then recommends a compromise. To
present the first extreme, Axelrod uses the Golden Rule to
describe a moral standard which would lead a person to
cooperate unconditionally in every situation: Do unto others
as you would have them do unto you.
The problem with this view is that turning the 
other cheek provides an incentive for the other 
player to exploit you. Unconditional cooperation 
cannot only hurt you, but it can hurt other 
innocent bystanders with whom the successful 
exploiters will interact later. Unconditional 
cooperation tends to spoil the other player; it 
leaves a burden on the rest of the community to
reform the spoiled player, suggesting that
reciprocity is a better foundation for morality 
than is unconditional cooperation.
Axelrod's point regarding the dangers of exploitation 
are well taken but his application here of the Golden Rule is 
inappropriate. It shows a lack of understanding of what is 
intended by that old piece of advice. A practitioner of the 
Golden Rule does not by definition engage a pattern of 
behavior that encourages exploitation of others or self, 
injury of "innocent bystanders," or that burdens the "rest of
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the community" with socially disfunctioning entities.
Indeed, it is conceivable to act in a way that discourages 
exploitation of self without also exercising a will to 
exploit in return. A parent who loves his/her children is 
concerned with their long-term emotional, mental, and 
physical growth and health. The parent will exercise 
disciple to discourage exploitative behavior in the children. 
The parent can do this with an appreciation also for the 
loving discipline they received (hopefully) from their 
parents.
The context in which the Golden Rule was originally 
conveyed, as well as how it is usually taught by parents and 
various types of groups in the present, suggests that the 
rule is to be applied with a will to benefit self and others; 
not to promote moral collapse.
Axelrod further states that "the Golden Rule would 
advise unconditional cooperation, since what you would really 
prefer the other player to do is to let you get away with 
some defections."91 While this motivation is probably 
exercised often enough in the real world, this is not 
necessarily the sole motivation behind use of the Golden 
Rule. The parenting example is obviously an exception. A 
live-and-let-live attitude represents a high commitment to 
cooperation. However, it can be possessed not only 
instrumentally as a kind of informal contract with our
91Axelrod, 136-137.
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environment (to permit us our peace and freedom of choice and 
behavior as long as we do the same in return) but also as an 
ideal regarding the most efficient and practical way to 
obtain the greatest health and benefit to self and others.
in a more dreary sense, it could be also adopted by an 
opportunistic player whose motive is to manipulate others 
solely for personal advantage. This would be a player whose 
self-interest is not self-defined to encompass something of 
the other’s private interest. As the Golden Rule is 
traditionally conveyed, a practitioner would possess a much 
broader definition of self-interest and how it impacts and is 
impacted by the interests of others. Furthermore, it seems 
logical that such an opportunistic player would readily 
substitute the Golden Rule with Every-Man-For-Himself if he 
felt he had the resources to gain advantage with a more 
direct and competitive approach. He is not a person 
convinced or very interested in the productive potential of 
the Golden Rule for all the players in his environment.
The second extreme presented by Axelrod is that of "an 
eye for an eye"; reciprocity in a most brutal form. A danger 
with this is the development of feuds and longstanding 
conflicts. He uses as examples the nuclear arms race and 
ongoing vendettas between ethnic groups. Current examples of 
the latter exist in just about every state in the world.
As a possible compromise for situations in which there 
is "no central authority to enforce community standards," 
Axelrod considers a reciprocity that might "return only nine-
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tenths of a tit for a tat. This would help dampen the 
echoing of conflict and still provide an incentive to the 
other player not to try gratuitous defections [from 
cooperation] .1,92
A problem with the concept of reciprocity as used by 
Axelrod, is that it does not say enough in itself. 
"Reciprocity" is more of a neutral term like "power." What 
are all the goals reciprocity serves for the practitioner?
How is it applied and in what circumstances? is there other 
ongoing activity between the players? Does a chosen form of 
reciprocity promote or inhibit attempts at communication and 
understanding? Does it build or degenerate existing levels 
of communication? Do the players possess common values that 
can serve as a bridge for effective communication and self- 
representation? Is the motivation(s) behind a reciprocating 
behavior perceived by the recipient as it was intended or as 
it was intended to be perceived by the initiator? After all, 
reciprocation is a form of communication. With more 
complicated players (e.g. states, economies, organizations), 
there will be a greater range of possible courses of action 
and forms of reciprocity that might be tried.
It was illustrated in Chapters II and III how the states 
of Sub-Saharan Africa are not in a position to adopt an 
extreme reciprocity toward the economic dominance of the
^Axelrod, 138.
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northern rich states. An equal dialogue of "tit for tat" is 
not one of their doable choices either.
A more realistic form of reciprocity is the pursuit of 
self-development and self-sufficiency. Agricultural 
independence from the north is a must. Most African states 
are not consistently working toward self-sufficiency in food 
staples. The governments have made an imbalanced effort to 
be like the northern states industrially, administratively, 
and militarily in order to enter the economy of that 
northern-westernized world. In doing so, African states have 
sacrificed far too much of their freedom. They have accepted 
entry into that other world on terms not favorable to 
themselves. They have had to sell too much of themselves to 
gain a crack at entry. The speed at which they have 
attempted westernized development is too fast to allow time 
to make certain they can feed, clothe, shelter, and educate 
their own people all along the way.
The ability to provide basic, simple necessities has 
been let go. Agriculturally, these states must import many 
of the food needs of their populations because too much of 
their own food producing resources have been turned over to 
cash cropping (for reasons already given in Chapter II).
Their ecosystems are being destroyed. Even with their 
problematic patterns and volumes of yearly rainfall, most of 
their land is lost to desert because of human activities.
These states must accept a slower pace of 
industrialization and economic "modernization." They must
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not continue to sacrifice their agricultural freedom in an 
effort to emulate the northern states. However, such 
decisions are not easily made since the African states are in 
debt already to financial organizations based in the north. 
Presently, most of the northern states also have become 
debtors to these organizations. Therefore, in the absence of 
any other motivation, northern governments can be pressured 
to apply pressure, in turn, to southern governments and 
economies to keep up a high pace of debt payment. The 
present pace leads only to the need for further refinancing 
and borrowing, further cash cropping and industrialization, 
and further need of southern politicians to ask for military 
and economic aid of the more powerful governments to shore up 
unstable political situations at home.
Aside from outside pressures on African states, I feel 
that their greatest impediment to creating some self- 
sufficiency lies in their urban populations. Chapter II 
addressed how members of the urban population can destabilize 
a government to the point of causing changes in leadership. 
Internal and external conflicts point to the need for 
persistent attempts at self-sufficiency in basic needs, 
communication and understanding between internal and external 
players, and education of youth to appreciate values which 
include the benefit of self along with all parts of the 
social and natural environment. The ability to diffuse 
potential civil strife and war would be enhanced if internal 
divisions were addressed politically with governments more
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representative of the ethnic and tribal groups in the state. 
Every group could share the burdens of making some decisions 
that would be unpopular.
A political approach more representative of all groups 
within the states would be consistent with Axelrod's three 
general recommendations for reforming a situation as outlined 
above. These will be applied briefly in the next few 
paragraphs.
"Enlarge the shadow of the future." Axelrod's two 
suggestions on how to do so are to make "the interactions 
more durable" and by making them more frequent. Direct 
involvement of all ethnic and tribal groups in government 
would increase the frequency of interaction as well as make 
the possibility of reciprocity more immediate and more 
lasting. Members would have to learn to work with each other 
just as do members of the U.S. Congress - not a perfect 
solution but much better than civil war.
"Change the payoffs." This would be accomplished via 
three structural conditions. Firstly, the new political 
setup would entice all groups to invest resources in the 
government since it offers, at least'in structure, 
opportunity to effect change. Secondly, there would be less 
chance of political gain for action prejudicial to other 
groups in the state. Thirdly, all groups should perceive a 
greater need to cooperate and make compromises in order to 
achieve anything at all - short-term or long-term.
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"Teach the players value, facts, and skills that will 
promote cooperation." This would occur in the daily course 
of working in the new structure. It would present an 
opportunity for exercising reciprocity that is more 
praticeable in the long-run just as members of the U.S.
Senate have developed an internal system of "help/hinder me 
with my proj ect and 1111 help/hinder you with yours. "
The most fundamental of Axelrod's suggestions is that of 
teaching youth the desirability of altruism and a nonvengeful 
form of reciprocity, i.e. exercised to improve the overall 
benefit of all involved. A government structure that 
includes members representative of all the groups in the 
state and gives to every member the same legal, political, 
social, and economic rights, has a chance to teach by example 
the values of altruism, cooperation, and mutually beneficial 
compromise. Of course, the goals of any system fail if its 
users do not make it work as intended. Thus, we see the 
requirement of advice on teaching our youth "values, facts, 
and skills that will promote cooperation."
A truly representative government is indeed a collective 
good. The decision-maker attitudes and perceptions already 
given would need to be fulfilled for such a good to be 
realized. If the ruling party/group/tribe were to adopt 
plans for greater participation of all other groups and a 
practiced equality of rights for every member, then dissident 
groups may be enticed to join and treat the new political 
structure as an opportunity. Their motivation may be mostly a
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desire for benefits that might be had. The possibility for 
private gain must become highly visible to overcome their 
alienation.
If private gains are not perceived as worthwhile, then 
the visibility of private costs for not joining must become 
greater. If the ruling group made the offer for a more 
representative government, then dissident groups might 
consider joining to be a necessary risk. Their main 
motivation probably would be a fear of damage to private 
interests which might result from being left out. There 
could be no posture of moral, self-righteous indignation to 
be convincingly assumed against such a new political 
structure since all groups would have been invited to 
realistically participate. This assumes, of course, that the 
representativeness of the new structure will be genuine. 
Obviously, this is a phenomenon witnessed about as often as 
the parting of a sea so that a prince, who gave away a 
position of power and popularity in one culture, could lead a 
conquered people of another culture to freedom from the one 
which favored him.
Opposition could still exist simply because another 
group wants to "do it" their way. They may present 
themselves as opposed to and incompatible with the political 
and economic ideology of the other groups. It would be 
either an excuse for wanting to acquire greater relative 
power and perhaps wealth or there truly could be some 
ideological differences. In the second case, if there is no
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willingness on any side to participate in a situation which 
permitted compromise, then there will be conflict because 
each has defined self-interest with a narrow scope.
Although dissident groups must participate eventually 
for any chance of cooperation to replace civil conflicts, 
little will change at any time until the dominant group(s) 
perceive direct "private" gains from cooperation or 
unacceptable "private" costs from noncooperation. This is 
the first change in attitude that must occur for any 
participant. Dissident groups which merely wish to place 
themselves in power at the expense of the current ruling 
group(s) will never achieve the resolution of civil strife.
Axelrod’s concept of the use of nonvengeful reciprocity 
would hold out hope for eventually providing an opportunity 
for mutually beneficial compromise. However, if the relative 
powers of each group do not always remain about equal, then 
there will be no maximum benefit achieved for all as long as 
their self-defined self-interest does not include the benefit 
of the private good of the others. Thus, we have the need 
for the second attitude/perception discussed in Chapters I & 
III: Private good must be perceived as at least partly
dependent upon the private good of others who also need the 
good(s) to be produced via cooperation.
This second condition can mean simply that the 
participants perceive the strength, health, wealth, or some 
aspect of the private good of other members as important to 
those members’ ability to contribute to a cooperatively-
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produced collective good. As given before, a military 
alliance or economic cartel provide clear examples. This 
second attitude/perception can be based further on 
identification with the private good of other members in ways
that go beyond a simple concern for how other members can be
made useful. Only a development or realization of some 
common values and interests could permit such an enlargement 
of self-interest. A family is the best and most prevalent 
example.
Axelrod's use of reciprocity would work well in the 
context of internal political, social, and economic problems
of these African states. The fact that most of the groups in 
conflict can find or develop some means of reciprocating 
against aggressive behavior from a more powerful group is a 
possible incentive for the dominant groups to work toward 
cooperative efforts at resolution of civil strife and the 
many other domestic troubles. A smaller group may only have
the ability to ally itself with a larger faction that opposes
the politically dominant party. Even this alternative can be 
enough to cause problems for their aggressors. Also, 
policies of outright cultural or physical genocide are more 
difficult to carry out in the modem world than in centuries 
past. The dominant group would likely receive adverse 
reactions from other states if public opinion became informed 
of such extreme actions. Even in the case of the small 
farming and pastoral communities in these Sub-Saharan states, 
the ruling parties are increasingly aware of how these
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peoples' productive capacity and/or how these people live on 
the land can have powerful effects on the long-run health of 
the state.
If we assume the possibility of most sides possessing 
some ability for reciprocation, cooperation still will be 
little if at all unless there is an attitude of willingness 
to accept a degree of dependence on other participants within 
a cooperative endeavor; a willingness to accept some loss of 
individual freedom of choice with regard to use of "private'' 
resources; and a willingness to accept some shared 
vulnerability due to others having increased awareness of 
needs, weaknesses, and strengths.
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APPENDIX 
FREE RIDER EFFECT
A radio station whose support is primarily dependent 
upon listeners and their contributions (i.e. there is little 
or no contractual support) is producing with its radio waves 
a service which they cannot (within the parameters of their 
broadcasting strength) determine exactly who gets it or how 
much of their service any user receives. The reception of 
their product cannot be controlled and is not completely 
contained in a market. Ultimately, they can decide to stop 
broadcasting out of lack of support or just the desire to do 
so, but, there is no middle ground. Provision of the radio 
waves is all or nothing within certain parameters and the use 
of their service by one person does not diminish its 
availability to others.
If the radio station is unable to receive its needed 
support from users of its service, then the organization is 
said to be suffering from the Free Rider Effect. The 
rationale of the free rider may be said to be comprised of 
three conceptual elements.
(a) The majority of users are aware that for any one of 
them to contribute according to the value they receive would 
not have enough effect to ensure the production function of 
the radio station.
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(b) Likewise, for any one person, the withholding of 
his/her potential payment for the value they obtain would not 
of itself undermine the radio station to any appreciable 
degree.
(c) As long as the radio station is functioning, it is 
reasonable to assume that the station has, at least, 
sufficient support for its present activities. This being 
the case, the rational actor sees his/her own distinctly 
private good as maximized by letting others provide support 
since his/her own lack of support does not diminish access.
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